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The passing of two Chief Justices
South Africa lost two Chief Justices in late 2012 and mid-2013.
Arthur Chaskalson, who served as President of the Constitutional
Court from 1994 to 2001 and Chief Justice from 2001 to 2005,
passed away on 1 December 2012. Among many achievements
and accolades, he was a member of the defence team in the
Rivonia Trial of 1963 and was one of the founders of the Legal
Resources Centre in 1979. (G Budlender ‘In Memoriam: The late
former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson’ (2013) 26 part 1 April
Advocate 8–10).
Pius Nkonzo Langa succeeded Athur Chaskalson as Chief
Justice in 2005, having served as Deputy Chief Justice from
2001. He retired in October 2009 and passed away on 24 July
2013. Justice Langa was a founding member of the National
Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL). He was among the
first judges appointed to the newly created Constitutional Court
and served with great distinction. (Moseneke ‘Public power on
behalf of the people’ (2013) 26 part 3 December Advocate 27–8).
Judicial appointments
In this section, we note one judicial appointment to the highest
court in 2013 before discussing a case that dealt with the criteria
for appointment to the magistrates’ courts. During the year under
review, Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga was appointed to the Consti-
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tutional Court. Shortly before his appointment, Justice Madlanga
was acting as one of the Evidence Leaders in the Marikana
Commission of Inquiry, discussed in greater detail elsewhere in
the chapter. He had also previously served as a judge but
resigned for personal reasons.
The appointment criteria for magistrates were considered in
Singh v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and
Others 2013 (3) SA 66 (EqC) where the complainant was a
vision-impaired Indian female who applied unsuccessfully for a
number of posts as a magistrate. She challenged the criteria and
process applicable to the appointment of magistrates on the
basis that they discriminated unfairly on the ground of disability.
Ledwaba J upheld the challenge and made an urgent, interim
order at the time of the hearing in January 2012. This judgment
provides his reasons for that order.
The applicant argued that the selection criteria used to short-
list candidates were unfairly discriminatory and based on inflex-
ible racial and gender-based preferences. Her disability was not
taken into account and neither was the need to redress the
legacy of discrimination against persons with disabilities (para
[10]). She also initially complained that the criteria for appoint-
ment included a driver’s licence, but this complaint fell away
during the proceedings. The respondents contended that the
absence of disability in the selection criteria was justified by the
inclusion of a general reference to section 174(2) of the Constitu-
tion, in terms of which ‘(t)he need for the judiciary to reflect
broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must
be considered when judicial officers are appointed’.
Ledwaba J, sitting as the Equality Court in Pretoria, held that
section 9(2) of the Constitution and section 4(2)(a) of the Promo-
tion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000 (‘the Equality Act’) place a complementary duty on the state
to take active measures to promote the equality of people with
disabilities (para [24]). While section 174(2) referred to race and
gender only, it used these as indicators of diversity, not as an
exhaustive list of factors. It was vital that disabled persons were
properly represented in the magistracy so that their unique
perspective could be properly articulated (para [30]).
Ledwaba J found on the facts that it was clear that the
appointment committees did not take the applicant’s disability
into account (para [32]). Although the respondents were entitled
to apply guidelines to assist them in making decisions, these
2 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
were not to be applied rigidly or inflexibly (para [37]). In addition,
the court held that it was not acceptable that the policy of the
Magistrates’ Commission was silent as far as people with disabili-
ties were concerned (para [46]). Ledwaba J commented that the
magistracy would not be diverse or legitimate if it represented
only the racial and gender composition of the country without
proper and proportionate representation of people with disabili-
ties (para [53]).
Ledwaba J thus confirmed his earlier order, which had directed
the Magistrates Commission to reconsider the shortlisting of
magistrates for the relevant vacant positions having regard to
disability, among other factors. The respondents had been
ordered to revise their policies to make express provision for
disability as a criterion (the order appears at para [1]). While
there has been considerable discussion and even litigation
regarding the criteria of race and gender in relation to judicial
appointments, Singh is an important reminder that disability and
other forms of disadvantage also require attention.
Judicial commissions of inquiry
The use of judges, whether sitting or retired, to chair commis-
sions of inquiry is no recent phenomenon. Their use is wide-
spread in South Africa and abroad but they are controversial. This
chapter has had occasion to comment on the inappropriate use
of judges to chair commissions of inquiry for overt political
purposes (see 1987 Annual Survey 493–5). At issue then was the
funding of an advertisement calling for the unbanning of the
African National Congress. The State President, Mr P W Botha,
had asserted in Parliament that Chris Ball, the Managing Director
of Barclays Bank (as it was then called) had been mentioned in
‘leftist circles’ as the person who had financed the advertisement.
This was denied by Ball and generated protests from the
business community. Thereafter, and in apparent response to the
outcry, the State President appointed a Commission of Inquiry
under the chairmanship of Mr Justice GGA Munnik, Judge
President of the Cape, to investigate and report on, inter alia, by
whom the advertisements had been placed, how and by whom
the newspapers had been paid, the source of the funds used to
pay for the advertisements, and whether Mr Ball was in any way
involved in the financial arrangements concerning the payment
for the placing of the advertisements. It was suggested that for
the State President to make a controversial statement in Parlia-
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ment and then to appoint a commission of inquiry into the truth of
his own statement was regrettable, and inappropriate.
There were other controversial uses of judicial commissions of
inquiry under apartheid. One of the more notorious instances was
the appointment of Mr Justice PJ Rabie in 1979 to chair the
inquiry into the necessity, adequacy, fairness and efficacy of the
legislation relating to the protection of internal security. Annexed
to his report, published in 1982, was draft legislation which was
swiftly enacted in the guise of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982,
the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982, the Intimidation Act
72 of 1982 and the Demonstrations in or Near Court Buildings
Prohibition Act 71 of 1982. The Internal Security Act, in particular,
was a hostile measure in keeping with the ‘total onslaught’
mentality prevalent at the time. It sanctioned detention without
trial for purposes of interrogation and the banning of individuals
and organisations. (See John Dugard ‘A triumph for executive
power — An examination of the Rabie Report and the Internal
Security Act 74 of 1982’ (1982) 99 SALJ 589 and ‘Any hope for
detainees? The Agget inquest and the Rabie Report compared’
(1983) 2 June Lawyers for Human Rights Bulletin). Mr Justice
Rabie was a Judge of Appeal when he produced the report. He
was later to become Chief Justice in 1982, the year his report was
tabled and the Internal Security Act was passed. He sat in and
presided over numerous cases concerning offences under the
Internal Security Act and matters of state security generally. His
role in these decisions, and the clear indications of handpicked
panels to hear these matters, wrought untold damage to the
administration of justice in South Africa. (See generally, Stephen
Ellmann In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa’s
State of Emergency (1992) and N Haysom and C Plasket ‘The war
against law: Judicial activism and the Appellate Division’ (1988) 4
SAJHR 303.)
But what of judicial commissions of inquiry under a democratic
dispensation? There have been a number of commissions of
inquiry in post-apartheid South Africa and their use continues to
be controversial. Of the post-apartheid judicial commissions of
inquiry, perhaps the most controversial is the (Seriti) Commission
of Inquiry into ‘Allegations of Fraud, Corruption, Impropriety or
Irregularity in the Strategic Defence Procurement Package’
(GN R926, GG 34731 of 4 November 2011). This Commission
was appointed by President Zuma in terms of section 84(2)(f) of
the Constitution. Although appointed in 2011, its first sitting took
4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
place in August 2013. It concerns the multi-billion rand arms deal
which has cast a shadow over South African political life for the
better part of a decade. It is not simply the magnitude of the
procurement that has been controversial but the widespread
allegations of bribery and corruption surrounding the process. At
the centre of these allegations is President Zuma himself. The
allegations emerged in acute form in the indictment against
Schabir Shaik, who was convicted on two counts of corruption
under section 1(1)(a) of the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 and one
of fraud. He was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The
details that follow emerge from the appeal judgment in S v Shaik
and Others 2007 (1) SA 240 (SCA). A further application for leave
to appeal to the Constitutional Court on conviction and sentence
failed (S v Shaik and Others 2008 (2) SA 208 (CC)).
It was alleged that Shaik and various corporate entities with
which he was associated had made some 238 payments, either
directly to, or for the benefit of, Jacob Zuma. These payments
had been made as an inducement to Jacob Zuma to use his
name and political influence for the benefit of Shaik’s business
(the Nkobi Group) or as an ongoing reward for having done so.
Shaik’s defence included that the payments had been made out
of the friendship between him and Jacob Zuma, or that they were
loans to the latter. These defences were rejected. There was a
strong inference that the acknowledgements of debt had been
contrived to be held in readiness should Shaik’s beneficence be
queried. Shaik had never sought repayment of the amounts paid
to Jacob Zuma, nor had he asserted a right to such repayment.
The amounts paid by Shaik to Jacob Zuma were in the vicinity of
R1,2 million. On this issue, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated
Making full allowance for the personal bonds of friendship there would
understandably have been between them arising out of their relation-
ship and their mutual interests prior to 1994, it is nevertheless clear
that Shaik was keenly aware of the many business opportunities that
the new political era offered and anxious not to miss them. For his part
Zuma was seen by Shaik and by others in the know as destined for
very high political office and possessed of the potent influence
appropriate to that situation. Added to that there was Zuma’s almost
crippling financial vulnerability. He had heavy family commitments but
wanted a smart and publicly visible lifestyle (para [102]).
One of the counts of corruption on which Shaik was convicted
concerned his participation in a consortium that had acquired a
stake in the provision of an armaments suite for naval corvettes as
part of the arms deal. It was alleged that at a time when it
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appeared that an inquiry would be held into aspects of the arms
deal, Shaik had arranged for the payment of a bribe by a French
company, Thomson-CSF, to Jacob Zuma in return for which he
would shield Thomson from the inquiry and thereafter would
promote its interests in South Africa. It was common cause that
Shaik had requested an amount of money to be paid by Thomson
to Jacob Zuma. His defence, however, was that the request had
nothing to do with an inquiry into the arms deal. He contended
that he had asked for a donation to be made to the Jacob Zuma
Education Trust. This evidence was rejected by the trial court as
clearly false and was not questioned on appeal (para [186]). The
Supreme Court of Appeal found that it had been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that ‘what Shaik described as a request for a
donation to the Jacob Zuma Education Trust was in fact a request
for the payment of a bribe to Zuma’ (para [203]). The court found
further, however, that it was not necessary for the state to prove
that Zuma was aware of the request by Shaik and that he agreed
to accept the bribe (para [205]).
That Jacob Zuma was not charged together with Schabir Shaik
was a matter of major controversy at the time. Later, in 2005, the
NDPP decided to prosecute him on corruption charges related to
monies received from Shaik and his companies. These charges
were later withdrawn. The decision to withdraw the charges is the
subject of ongoing litigation (see National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) and Democratic
Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012
(3) SA 486 (SCA)). It is against this background, therefore, that
President Zuma’s decision to appoint a commission of inquiry into
a matter in which he is personally implicated must be assessed.
This will be discussed below.
In August 2012 a tragic incident occurred at the Marikana Mine
in Rustenburg in the midst of an industrial dispute. Police
intervention resulted in the deaths of approximately 44 people
and injuries to 70 others. The incident was likened to the
massacre at Sharpeville in 1960. It attracted national and interna-
tional publicity. In consequence, President Zuma established a
judicial commission of inquiry chaired by retired Supreme Court
of Appeal Judge, Ian Farlam, to conduct a wide-ranging investi-
gation. Five areas of investigation were identified. These were the
conduct of Lonmin Plc, the owner of the mine; the conduct of
the South African Police Service; the conduct of the Association
of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU); the conduct of
6 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM); the role played by the
Department of Mineral Resources; and ‘the conduct of individuals
and loose groupings in fermenting and/or otherwise promoting a
situation of conflict and confrontation which may have given rise
to the tragic incident, whether directly or indirectly’ (Proclamation
50 of 2012, GG 35680 of 12 September 2012). By subsequent
amendment, the Proclamation of the Commission of Inquiry was
deemed to have come into operation on 11 January 2013
(Proclamation 4 of 2013, GG 36154 of 12 February 2013). In
terms of this amendment, the Commission was directed to
complete its work by no later than 31 May 2013. That deadline
has been exceeded by more than a year, and has precipitated
amendments further extending the deadline for completion. The
most recent amendment set 31 July 2014 as the deadline
(Proclamation 30 of 2014, GG 37611 of 5 May 2014), which too
will not be met.
The events at Marikana shocked the nation. Vivid images of the
shootings were broadcast on all major domestic and international
television networks. What was required was a swift and incisive
investigation into what occurred. The report of the Commission is
unlikely to see the light of day within two years of the incident. This
is the product of two problems. First, the terms of reference are
hopelessly wide and require the investigation of a diversity of
factual and sociological issues. Second, the manner in which the
proceedings have been conducted has resulted in the inquiry
dragging on interminably. It is long settled that proceedings
before commissions of inquiry are inquisitorial and that there is a
wide discretion in how they are conducted. The chairman, Mr
Justice Farlam, has allowed the Marikana Commission at times to
degenerate into an uncontrolled and rambling free-for-all, much
like an insufficiently managed adversarial trial with little control,
certainly at the initial stages, over cross-examination and selec-
tion of witnesses. This may be contrasted with the Commission
of Inquiry into Policing in Khayelitsha established by the Premier
of the Western Cape which proceeded only after the Constitu-
tional Court rejected a challenge to it by national government
(Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape 2014 (1) SA 1
(CC)), and which is chaired by former Constitutional Court
Justice, Kate O’Regan. It has issued taut guidelines for evidence
and cross-examination, and it has kept all parties on an impres-
sively tight leash, attracting admiring public comment. (See,
generally, the reports on GroundUp (www.groundup.org.za).)
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This Commission enjoys unparalleled political legitimacy, not only
because of the known independence and integrity of its presiding
members (which include former National Director of Public
Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli), but because it was established in
response to sustained pressure on the Premier by an impres-
sively diverse range of civil society organisations with knowledge
of the appalling policing conditions in Khayelitsha.
The Seriti and Farlam Commissions, both far from completion,
raise important questions concerning judicial commissions of
inquiry. In a seminal article, Jack Beatson critically analyses the
use of judges to head public inquiries (‘Should judges conduct
public inquiries?’ 2005 LQR 221). Drawing on experiences in the
United Kingdom and Israel, he discusses five arguments that are
traditionally advanced in support of the use of judges to chair
public inquiries: skills and availability; independence and impar-
tiality; authority; structure and formality without the constraints of
litigation; and achievement of closure.
The argument most frequently advanced in favour of judicial
inquiries is that ‘judges are experienced and skilled in the sifting
and evaluation of evidence and in analysing material in a rational
way’ (230). Most fundamentally, judges ‘are independent in the
sense of being absent from direction and generally seen . . . as
institutionally apolitical’ (234). Acknowledging the legitimacy of
this claim in general terms, Beatson suggests that this argument
is strongest ‘where the task of the inquiry is solely to find facts’ but
‘less compelling where issues of social or economic policy with
political implications are involved’ (230). He points out that the
paradox of the independence and impartiality arguments is also
seen as the reason for not allowing judges to conduct inquiries as
‘[t]here are political dangers for judicial independence when
matters of acute political controversy are referred to a judge for
an impartial opinion’ (236). Expanding on the potential to compro-
mise the reputation of the judiciary, he argues that ‘the involve-
ment of a judge will not depoliticise an inherently controversial
matter, and it is a mistake to raise false expectations that it will do
so. Political issues cannot be resolved by the application of
judicial standards and court-like procedures’ (235). In addition,
there is the risk of subjecting the judge to strident public criticism.
Where a topic is politically controversial and the report is neither a
binding enforceable decision nor correctable by an appeal, those
disagreeing with it may be unable to resist the temptation of seeking to
discredit its findings by fierce criticism of the judge. If the Government
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or institution has been cleared, the dissenters will describe the judge
as an establishment lackey. . . . If Government or the institution is
criticised, the judge will be described as naïve and unfamiliar with the
reality of Government. . . . (236).
Judicial independence and impartiality can also be endan-
gered in that ‘the initiative in setting up and proposing the terms
of reference of such inquiries lies with Government’. This may be
seen as undermining independence ‘because the appointment in
a sense ‘‘links’’ the judge with the Government which made the
appointment’, and ‘often Government is deeply involved in the
subject of the inquiry and it is not usual for one of the players to
select the referee’ (238).
In assessing these (and other arguments), Beatson does not
place a great deal of weight on the threat of adverse criticism
because this arises in controversial cases which judges deal with
in the ordinary course (241–2). An important point Beatson
makes, however, is that merely because judges have the neces-
sary fact-finding skills is unpersuasive since senior lawyers and
retired judges have the same skills (230).
In the context of South African commissions of inquiry, Beat-
son’s discussion has a particular resonance. The choice of Mr
Justice Rabie to chair the inquiry into security legislation — a
topic heavily laden with political ideology and policy — not only
spawned inevitable criticism following his recommendations, but
thereafter tainted him as a judge with an ideological agenda who
headed the ‘emergency team’ of handpicked appellate judges
during the successive states of emergency (Ellmann, above
57–138). It is submitted that the Seriti Commission into the arms
deal is destined to suffer a similar fate. It has already been mired
in controversy with the resignations of Justice Legodi (who was
originally appointed as a member of the Commission), and
evidence leader, Mr Norman Moabi, who alleged in his letter of
resignation that there was a perception that the Commission,
particularly Justice Seriti, had a secret agenda not compatible
with its mandate to establish the truth (see, inter alia, ‘Cloud Over
Seriti Arms Deal Probe’ The Witness Online, 17 January 2013, and
‘Investigator Quits Arms Probe, Questions Integrity — Report’ City
Press Online, 17 January 2013). The Commission has taken to
issuing media statements in response to criticism. These are all
available on the Commission’s website (www.armscomm.org.za).
Justice Seriti took it upon himself to respond to Moabi’s
criticism. In the course of a lengthy statement, he speculated that
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Moabi made ‘these false allegations to deliberately tarnish the
image and credibility of the Commission probably because of a
personal grudge he harbours against me based on reasons he
has not disclosed’. Dealing with statements by unidentified
individuals upon which Moabi relied for his contention that there
was a secret agenda, Justice Seriti stated that he did not recall
making such utterances. However, even if he ‘may have uttered
words similar to those’ attributed to him, this would not show the
existence of a secret agenda. He drew attention to certain factors
‘which strongly militate against the existence of a secret agenda’
including the fact that he is a ‘senior judge’ and is ‘fully conscious
of the oath of office’ that he took. Moreover, he is assisted by two
other senior judges ‘whose integrity is beyond reproach’ (press
statement by Justice Seriti, 22 January 2013). In a display of
solidarity, the remaining evidence leaders issued a memorandum
on the same day. They noted that ‘the Chairperson and the
Commissioners are respected judges of the Superior Courts’ and
that they, as evidence leaders, ‘are all independent legal practi-
tioners in private practice and are not employed by the Arms
Commission’. They stated that ‘at no time have we gained the
impression that matters are being hidden from us’, and that none
of them had received any ‘instructions’ in any form. They con-
cluded by expressing their ‘confidence in the leadership of the
Honourable Chairperson and the Commissioners in the execution
of their mandate’ (memorandum by evidence leaders, 22 January
2013). The need for self-justification does not augur well for the
Commission. As Lord Denning aptly pointed out in the context of
contempt of court, judges must ‘rely on (their) conduct itself to be
its own vindication’ (R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis:
Ex parte Blackburn (2) [1968] 2 QB 150 (CA) 155).
The second reason identified by Beatson in support of judicial
inquiries turns on the authority of the report that ‘comes from the
office of the Judge and his or her individual and institutional
reputation for independence’ (243). But, as Beatson rightly points
out, the fact that an inquiry report ‘is not dispositive means that it
can be rejected by the Government or by the court of public
opinion’ (243). The rejection of a report by a judicial commission
of inquiry acquires significance where the rejection is based
upon ‘a finding of primary fact or a recommendation as to
personal responsibility’ (245). In these instances, the authority of
the particular judge may well be undermined. Again this reso-
nates with the South African experience.
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With regard to the advantage of structure and formality without
the constraints of litigation, Beatson points out that it is sometimes
argued that the use of a judge brings ‘dignity’ to the proceedings
and that an inquiry may be particularly appropriate ‘where there
is no possibility of recourse to litigation and no ready political
response’ (247). He nevertheless points out that generally judges
have a discretion regarding the procedure adopted at an inquiry.
However, ‘the way the discretion is exercised may reflect but also
mask differences of view as to the nature of inquiries and the
extent to which adversarial elements should be allowed to shape
procedure’ (247).
In the South African context there is the ever present danger of
judicialising an inquiry and effectively turning it into a trial. This is
plainly what has occurred at the Marikana Commission resulting
in major delays where expedition was called for. Of course,
inquisitorial procedures must be fair. This, however, ought to be
creatively used having particular regard to the ultimate purposes
sought to be achieved by the inquiry. In Marikana, for example,
six witnesses have each testified for seventeen or more days.
This is indicative of insufficient control over the proceedings,
turning the inquiry into a lengthy and extensive trial.
As to the achievement of closure, Beatson points out that the
capacity of a judicial inquiry to draw a line under a crisis depends
on a number of factors. These include the extent to which the
authority, independence and impartiality of the judge conducting
the inquiry remain unimpaired, the extent to which the findings
and recommendations are publicly accepted, as well as the
terms of reference (250). It remains to be seen whether either
the Seriti or Farlam Commissions will bring closure to the matters
under investigation.
Whether or not the use of judges in commissions of inquiry
breaches the separation of powers has been given a qualified
answer by the Constitutional Court. In South African Association
of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC), the
court noted that the tradition of using judges to preside over
commissions of inquiry comes from the era of parliamentary
sovereignty, and that what is now permissible must be deter-
mined in the light of the Constitution and not past practices. With
regard to the question of judges presiding over commissions of
inquiry, the court noted that ‘much may depend on the subject-
matter of the Commission’. In appropriate circumstances, ‘judi-
cial officers can no doubt preside over commissions of inquiry
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without infringing the separation of powers’, since the perfor-
mance of such functions ‘ordinarily calls for the qualities and
skills required for the performance of judicial functions — inde-
pendence, the weighing up of information, the forming of an
opinion based on information, and the giving of a decision on the
basis of a consideration of relevant information’ (para [34]). It
seems clear that the court envisaged situations in which the use
of judges to preside over commissions of inquiry would be
inappropriate and in breach of the separation of powers.
It is submitted that practice under the Constitution in relation to
commissions of inquiry is not markedly different from the prior
regime. This is undesirable in principle. A great deal of care ought
to be required before judges enter the inevitable terrain of
controversy and politics. Judges are not obliged to accept
appointments to chair inquiries. Beatson points out that in the
Australian State of Victoria, judges have refused to serve on
commissions of inquiry since 1923 following the view of the then
Chief Justice (222–3). Governments sometimes appoint commis-
sions of inquiry as a means of diverting criticism or shifting
responsibility from particular individuals and institutions. Judges
should be wary of lending their credibility to such processes.
Judicial accountability
In the 2012 Annual Survey, we concluded this section of the
review by predicting that the proceedings of three tribunals
enquiring into alleged judicial misconduct ‘ought to be underway,
and perhaps concluded, by the end of 2013, barring further court
challenges to their operations.’ We experience little pleasure in
the accuracy of the implicit prediction that such challenges would
arise, delaying the completion of two very long-running inquiries
into alleged judicial indiscipline, as well as a more recent one.
The primary source of the further drawing-out of these proceed-
ings is, however, particularly disquieting.
Any observer of the South African legal system of the past ten
years will be familiar with a series of allegations and court
challenges surrounding the seemingly reluctant attempts by the
Judicial Service Commission (‘JSC’) to deal with complaints about
the conduct of the Judge President of the Western Cape High
Court, John Hlophe. The issue, which remains alive at this stage,
stems from a complaint lodged against him by all the serving
justices of the Constitutional Court in late May 2008, alleging
attempted interference with two of their members, Justice Nka-
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binde and (then) Acting Justice Jafta, now a full member of that
court, regarding a case before them at the time. After much back
and forth and several rounds of litigation, details of which are
recorded in the Annual Surveys of the past five years, this
complaint, as well as those relating to the drunk-driving convic-
tion of Judge Motata, and the complaint about tardy execution of
their work against Judges Mavundla, Poswa, Preller and Webster
of the Gauteng North High Court, were referred by the full JSC in
late 2012 to a Judicial Conduct Tribunal (‘JCT’).
Such tribunals were duly composed by the Chief Justice, as
required by Chapter 3 of the JSC Amendment Act of 2008, which
came into force on 10 June 2010. The first to sit was that dealing
with Judge Hlophe on 30 September 2013, and it was faced from
the outset with a jurisdictional challenge from a totally unantici-
pated quarter. Its president, retired Judge Labuschagne and his
colleagues heard from Justices Nkabinde and Jafta that they
objected to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because no formal com-
plaint had been laid before it in the manner required by the
amended Act. Judge Hlophe associated himself with this objec-
tion. Of course the amendments only occurred after the formal
laying of the original complaint by then Chief Justice Langa, on
behalf of the Constitutional Court, and the justices had at no stage
indicated that they would so object. When the JCT duly overruled
this objection, Justices Nkabinde and Jafta launched review pro-
ceedings in the High Court, adding a further ground of objection, to
the effect that it was an unlawful contravention of the separation of
powers for section 24(1) of the Act to authorise the president of the
JCT to appoint a public prosecutor to lead the evidence at such a
tribunal.
This application for judicial review has effectively stopped the
Hlophe JCT in its tracks and, predictably, the JCT appointed
to hear the Motata matter, as well as the tribunal to hear the
complaints about slow execution of judicial work, have not
proceeded with their work pending the outcome of the review. In
fact, the last JCT has also been challenged directly in review
proceedings by Judge Poswa, accusing the JSC itself of dilatory
and obstructionist behaviour, while the other judges have argued
that the delays in producing their judgments were due to ‘sys-
temic’ problems in the High Court.
The net result of all this is that the disciplinary mechanisms, so
long anticipated and designed with such care to seek to deliver
the JSC from its many failings in this aspect of its work, have been
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stalled in their tracks, and an outcome (with the possibility of
appeals to higher courts) is unlikely for at least another year.
Once again, therefore, untested allegations besmirch the reputa-
tions of at least six senior judges, and the reputation of the entire
superior court judiciary is sullied. Given the increasing evidence
of maladministration and professional malpractice which has
begun to feature in this chapter of the Annual Survey and which is
reflected, sometimes alarmingly, below, alarm bells must neces-
sarily be sounding in the corridors of the Office of the Chief
Justice.
This bleak picture is strongly accentuated by the JSC’s contin-
ued inability to steer clear of controversy and even unlawfulness
in its other function, that of appointing judges. The potential
tension between the requirements of section 174(1) and (2) of the
Constitution has from the outset created difficulty for the JSC,
because it ‘must’ satisfy itself as to a judicial appointee’s appro-
priate qualification, fitness and propriety to hold judicial office,
while at the same time it is obliged to ‘consider’ the ‘need for the
judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition’ of
the country. In April 2011, the JSC interviewed seven short-listed
candidates for possible appointment to three vacancies in the
Western Cape High Court, but recommended the appointment of
the only black candidate, leaving two vacancies to be filled later.
The Cape Bar Council (‘CBC’) challenged this decision as invalid
and unconstitutional, relying broadly on two arguments: that the
JSC had been improperly constituted when reaching that deci-
sion, as neither the President nor Deputy President of the SCA
was present at the meeting; and because the JSC had no reason
not to fill the vacancies, and that its failure to do so made its
decision irrational and unconstitutional. The court a quo (Koen
and Mokgohloa JJ, brought in from outside the division to hear
the case) found in favour of this challenge (Cape Bar Council v
JSC 2012 (4) BCLR 406 (WCC)), but also gave the JSC leave to
appeal its decision.
The JSC duly appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal — the
judgment is reported as Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar
Council 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA). The JSC initially raised two points
in limine: that the decision was effectively not amenable to review
at all as such decisions were excluded from the definition of
‘administrative action’ by section 1 of the Promotion of Administra-
tive Justice Act (‘PAJA’) of 2000; and that the CBC should from the
outset have joined Judge Henney (the successful applicant for
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appointment) in its review application as he was clearly an
interested party. Only the latter point was pursued by the JSC on
appeal, and the CBC anticipated it by seeking at that stage to join
both Henney and the six other candidates. This aspect of the
appeal proceedings drew some differences of opinion from
among the parties and the candidates, and an opportunistic
accused convicted of criminal conduct by Judge Henney sought
to make his status as a judge a matter for appeal (paras [8],
[9]). Therefore, there were five issues which had to be decided
(para [10]), three related to process, while two focused on
the substance of the JSC’s conduct. We shall concentrate on the
latter.
Before turning to the substantial questions, the Supreme Court
of Appeal (Brand JA, with whom Cloete, Snyders, Mhlantla and
Petse JJA concurred) saw fit to emphasise that decisions of the
JSC relating to the appointment of judges, while clearly excluded
from review under section 1(gg) of the PAJA, remained review-
able like any other exercise of public power under the principle of
legality (paras [19]–[22]). As to the composition of the JSC when
it decided not to fill the vacancies, the JSC argued that the fact
that Mpati P had been present until the day before the decision
was taken and that not all the members of the JSC had to be
present at all times, meant that the decision was validly taken.
The judges did not agree: the President of the Supreme Court of
Appeal was named in the Constitution as one of its ex officio
members, as was the Chief Justice, and so his presence was
mandatory, and his Deputy had not even been invited to attend.
There was also precedent to rely on in the form of Acting
Chairperson: JSC v Premier of the Western Cape Province 2011
(3) SA 538 (SCA), one of the several Hlophe-related legal
challenges (paras [26]–[33]). The mandatory requirement of the
presence of the ex officio members of the JSC also implied that
no decision taken in their absence could stand (paras [34]–[36]).
The appeal court then moved to consider the rationality of the
JSC’s decision to leave two vacancies on the Cape Bench,
despite there being at least sufficient interviewed candidates who
were appropriately qualified and fit and proper for appointment.
The CBC had asked the JSC for reasons for its decision, to which
the JSC had responded that none of the candidates had received
sufficient votes for recommendation. It was not denied that
the three candidates proposed by the CBC satisfied the require-
ments of section 174(1), nor was it said that race or gender
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considerations had played a role in the decision, only that they
had not received support of the majority of the JSC (paras [38],
[39]). Essentially, the JSC argued that it had no duty to give
reasons; that it had in fact given such a reason, being non-
majority support; and that the secret voting practice adopted by
the JSC did not allow it to provide reasons (para [42]). While
acknowledging that there was no express obligation to give
reasons, the Supreme Court of Appeal responded that this was
clearly implied, founded in the constitutional duties to act in a
rational, non-arbitrary, transparent and accountable manner
(para [43]). On this basis, there was no other way to prove
rational action without giving reasons; how could anyone rebut
the sort of response provided by the JSC in this case: ‘Trust me, I
have good reasons, but I am not prepared to provide them?’
(para [44]). Once it was accepted that such an obligation existed
in law, the JSC could not plead that its current way of operating
was not conducive to the provision of reasons — it could not
argue that practice determined the legal principles, rather that
legal principle determined practice (paras [45]–[50]). The court
was careful to add that this obligation did not exist in each and
every circumstance in which the JSC decided matters, but it
certainly applied in the context of the appeal. Consequently, the
failure to comply with the request to give reasons meant that
the JSC’s decision not to fill the vacancies was irrational and
unlawful (para [51]).
Finally, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the question
of the validity in law of the voting procedure adopted by the JSC,
which the Cape court had declared to be unconstitutional, an
argument pursued on appeal by the amicus curiae, the Centre for
Constitutional Rights. Although this procedure was ‘shrouded in
obscurity’, and although the JSC had given two conflicting
versions of how its members voted, the appeal court declined to
consider and rule on this question, as any finding would be both
‘redundant and based on uncertain facts’ (para [53]). The appeal
was dismissed with costs.
The outcome of this case adds another stinging rebuff to the
high-handed and opaque manner in which the JSC operates
when recommending the appointment of judges, which courts
have ruled on repeatedly over the past five years. Given the vital
role ascribed to the JSC by the Constitution, and the fact that it is
chaired by the Chief Justice and has many leading figures in the
administration of justice among its members, this woeful record is
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at least embarrassing, if not an indictment of its own sense of
fairness. There has been much comment on this record in the
media and more litigation is anticipated. Unless there is a shift in
the approach of the ‘party political’ element within the ranks of the
JSC, its popular image and the lack of respect accorded to it by
the legal profession, are likely to decline further, and the Constitu-
tion itself will be undermined.
Judicial recusal
The duty to be aware of the perceptions of both the parties and
the public as to potential bias in a judicial officer is an onerous
one. Challenges to judicial decisions — either at the outset or
during a trial, or afterwards as a means of upsetting the decision
— based on perceptions of favouring one side in litigation
because of past associations, are not uncommon, and two such
matters fall to be commented on in the past year.
In Minister of Safety and Security v Jongwa and Another 2013
(3) SA 455 (ECG), a decision in the Queenstown Magistrate’s
Court, was challenged in the Eastern Cape High Court, on the
basis that the magistrate concerned had been involved in an
intimate relationship with the attorney who appeared for the
plaintiff in a successful claim for damages against the police for
wrongful arrest and detention. It appeared that several months
after the judgment had been handed down, the legal advisor to
the police service in Queenstown (Von Papendorp) had
approached the magistrate concerned to apprise him of his
concerns on this score, stating that in his view recusal would
have been appropriate. The magistrate was taken aback, and
asked Von Papendorp whether the latter thought that his judg-
ment had been wrong, to which Von Papendorp responded that
he thought it had been correct, but that the quantum of damages
awarded had been too high and that the amount awarded as to
costs had also been excessive. Von Papendorp then met the
attorney herself, and tried to persuade her to advise her client,
the successful plaintiff, to abandon the judgment, after which the
two parties could pursue a settlement of the matter. He followed
this up with a letter to the attorney essentially repeating the
above. The proposals proved fruitless: the plaintiff, now respon-
dent, was unwilling to forego her success, and the attorney and
magistrate both claimed that their relationship, out of which a
child had been born, had in fact ended before the matter in
question served before the magistrate so that there was no
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reasonable basis for alleging bias. Von Papendorp persisted in
alleging bias (paras [7]–[25]).
When the matter came before Pickering J on review, he noted
that, despite the irreconcilable differences which existed on the
papers, counsel for the Minister had specifically declined to refer
the dispute for oral evidence, with the result that it had to be
accepted that the relationship had in fact ended by the time that
the magistrate heard the matter. As the applicant’s entire argu-
ment had been built solely on the alleged existence of a
relationship at the time the matter was heard, much of its thrust
fell away. The applicant, however, argued further that the admis-
sion that there had been an intimate relationship between the
magistrate and the attorney beforehand, was enough to found a
reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of those who
appeared before the magistrate (paras [29]–[32]). Before consid-
ering the merit of this submission, the judge felt constrained
to comment on the length of time it had taken Von Papendorp to
raise his concerns — a full nine months after the handing down of
judgment. The only explanation was that Von Papendorp had
been redeployed to other duties during the Soccer World Cup in
2010, which in the judge’s view was ‘woefully inadequate’.
Despite this, however, he felt it necessary to deal with the merits
of the arguments (para [33]). A further aspect which called for
judicial censure was Von Papendorp’s conduct in approaching
both the magistrate and the attorney in his attempts to settle the
matter without an appeal or review. Pickering J described this as
‘entirely improper and unprofessional’ (para [34]).
On the merits, the judgment provides an excellent summary of
the existing law on recusal, in which the right to a fair trial in
section 34 of the Constitution and the seminal judgment in
President of the RSA v South African Rugby Football Union 1999
(4) SA 137 (CC) provide the founding principles (paras
[36]–[41]). Pickering J refers to several thorny examples of these
principles being applied in practice, such as the appearances as
counsel of his wife before Mogoeng J (as he then was, in S v
Dube 2009 (2) SACR 99 (SCA)), of the elder son of Chaskalson P
in the SARFU case, and in the same case a reference to the fact
that Trengove SC had appeared before his father, Trengove JA,
then on the Supreme Court of Appeal (paras [43]–[46]). He then
refers to an article written by Wallis JA, who advances, by
reference to developments in the United Kingdom, the view that
the application of the rule may be shifting in practice to exclude
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such appearances by close family members (para [47]). Never-
theless, in the current case, Pickering J decided that such issues
were a matter of degree, and that the relationship such as had
existed between the magistrate and attorney did not fall foul of
the rule against bias, necessitating recusal, and so the applica-
tion was dismissed with costs (paras [51], [52]).
One can imagine that the type of situation which gave rise to
the dispute in Jongwa might arise with a degree of frequency in
smaller towns where the group of legal professionals is relatively
small, and where social intercourse may well occur mostly within
its ranks: in the circumstances, Judge Pickering’s decision
seems a realistically wise one. The next reported case which
raises conflicts of interest as its central argument, however, lies
almost at the opposite extreme of the spectrum: here we have
applicants in a high-value commercial dispute throwing the book,
so to speak, at almost everyone else associated with the trial, to
an extent which appears far-fetched. It is appropriate to consider
this case under the heading of professional practice, which
follows after the next section.
Enforcement of regional decisions
The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and
Others 2013 (5) (SA) 325 (CC) involved the expropriation of the
respondent farmers’ land by the government of Zimbabwe (Zim-
babwe) pursuant to its constitutionally authorised land-reform
policy. The farmers approached the Southern African Develop-
ment Community Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) for relief and the Tribunal
decided in their favour. Zimbabwe failed to comply with its
decision. The farmers again approached the Tribunal for relief.
The Tribunal found in their favour and granted a costs order
against Zimbabwe. Again Zimbabwe failed to comply.
The farmers approached the North Gauteng High Court, Preto-
ria (‘High Court’) for the registration and enforcement of the costs
order in South Africa. The High Court ordered the registration and
execution of the costs order against property of Zimbabwe in
South Africa. Zimbabwe applied to the High Court for the
rescission of the order, but the application was dismissed.
Zimbabwe appealed unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court of
Appeal. Aggrieved by that outcome, Zimbabwe sought leave to
appeal to the Constitutional Court.
In a majority judgment, written by the Chief Justice, the court
developed the common law on the enforcement of foreign
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judgments and orders to apply to those of the Tribunal. The majority
held that the High Court had correctly ordered that the costs order
be enforced in South Africa.
Not only must the relevant provisions of the Treaty be taken into
account as we develop the common law, but so must the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights be promoted. A construction of
the Amended Treaty as well as the right of access to courts, with due
regard to the constitutional values of the rule of law, human rights,
accountability, responsiveness and openness, enjoins our courts to
be inclined to recognise the right of access to our courts to register
and enforce the Tribunal’s decision. This will, as indicated above, be
achieved by extending the meaning of ‘foreign court’ to the Tribunal.
The need to do so is even more pronounced since Zimbabwe, against
which an order sanctioned by the Treaty was made by the Tribunal,
does, in terms of its Constitution, deny the aggrieved farmers access
to domestic courts and compensation for expropriated land. Of
importance also is the fact that a further resort to the Tribunal was
necessitated by Zimbabwe’s refusal to comply with the decision of the
Tribunal (para [68]).
The court held that that development was provided for by the
SADC legal instruments on the enforcement of the decisions of
the Tribunal in the region. The majority also held that the
Constitution enjoins our courts to develop the common law in
order to facilitate the enjoyment of the rights provided for in the
Bill of Rights, such as the right of access to courts, compensation
for expropriation, and the rule of law, which, in terms of the
amendment to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, would have been
denied to the farmers had the costs order of the Tribunal not
been enforced. For these reasons the appeal was dismissed
with costs. The judgment is an important affirmation of South




Professional practice: ‘Routine issues’
An apparent conflict of interests as well as an attempt to cause
the recusal of a judge because of past professional associations,
characterised Wishart and Others v Blieden NO and Others 2013
(6) SA 59 (KZP), in which applicants had been summoned to
appear before Blieden J in an enquiry under section 417 of the
Companies Act 61 of 1973. The applicants had initially refused to
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attend such an enquiry, and had submitted through their attorney
that Blieden J should refuse to allow the second to fourth
respondents (all advocates briefed in the matter) to appear,
which the judge had declined to order. The current application
initially sought to review and set aside this decision, but the quest
for this relief was abandoned, and narrowed to focus on the
second to fourth respondents, seeking their exclusion from any
participation in examining the applicants on the grounds that they
were subject to a conflict of interest and were privy to confidential
information in the matter (paras [1], [2]). This judgment then
essentially turned into a dispute between the applicants and
these three respondents, as well as their instructing attorney.
The matter was heard in Pietermaritzburg by Gorven J, who
started (paras [1]–[15]) by outlining the facts and allegations at
some length, relating to the relationship of the respondents to the
applicants, through the web of companies in which the latter had
material interests, one of which, Avstar, was the subject of the
impugned enquiry. He concluded (para [16]) that ‘. . . the appli-
cants make out no case on the papers that confidential disclo-
sures concerning Avstar were made to any of the respondents’.
This was not the end of the matter, however, as the judge then
had to dispose of a number of further arguments on behalf of
applicants, beginning with an application for his recusal. This
aspect of the application was based on the fact that some eight
years before this trial, while still an advocate in practice, the
judge had participated in sequestration and related proceedings
in which second respondent had also participated, although at
no stage were they co-counsel or briefed by the same attorneys.
Indeed, the application for recusal only followed when Judge
Gorven, probably sensing the apprehensions of the applicants,
mentioned this incident at the outset of proceedings in this
matter. After the judge provided a detailed account of his
interaction with the second respondent, the applicant persisted
with his application for recusal. Judge Gorven referred to the
Code of Judicial Conduct now in operation in this country, and
reiterated that his dealings with the second respondent were on a
‘purely professional level’, as a result of which he dismissed the
application for his recusal, as no ‘reasonable, objective and
informed person would . . . reasonably apprehend’ that he would
not bring an impartial mind to bear on the dispute (paras
[19]–[23]).
As to the final interdict sought by applicants, Gorven J held that
the test for the granting of this interdict (para [24]) was uncontro-
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versial, but that its application in this case needed to be seen in
the context of ‘the legal contours which bear on this relief’ in a
number of different national jurisdictions, viz England, the United
States of America, Canada and Australia (paras [26]–[33]). He set
out the comparative law in some detail, because applicants had
invited him to develop the South African law along the lines
followed in Australia (para [34]), before setting out the law, as he
saw it, in this country, relying on the approach taken in the
Competition Appeal Court and elsewhere in several cases deal-
ing with the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client
(paras [35]–[38]). Having defined the test to be applied (para
[39]), Gorven J applied this to the facts before him, dealing with
the question of standing, which became an issue as the appli-
cants claimed a relationship of ‘informal client’ of the respon-
dents, through their stake in the companies involved in the
litigation. After detailed consideration of the facts and disputed
averments, he concluded that the applicants’ right not to be
examined could not be supported on any grounds, and that, as
the law in South Africa currently stood, the respondents owed no
legal duty, either past or present, to the applicants (para [50]).
Again, this was not enough to dispose of the application,
because it had been argued that the judge ought, in the
circumstances and exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the
courts to do so (as confirmed in section 173 of the Constitution) to
be developing South African law in the light of the comparative
experience already set out. Gorven J acknowledged (para [52])
two instances in which this jurisdiction ought to be exercised:
when the common law is inconsistent with a constitutional provi-
sion, or when such a rule falls short of the ‘spirit, purport and
objects’ of the Bill of Rights (Constitution, s 39 (2) referring to S v
Thebus 2003 (6) 505 SA (CC) para [28]). However, he held that
neither of the latter triggers to such jurisdiction existed here, but
speculated that it was possible that, if it had been established
that the applicants had been ‘informal clients’, a legal duty in
delict may have arisen as a result. However, such a situation
would arise only if the facts warranted any development at all
which, after further review of case authority both here and
abroad, the judge was unable to establish (para [57]). The
applicants had, therefore, signally failed to prove the clear right
required to grant an interdict, and the application was dismissed
with costs.
While a reading of the report suggests that the application was
at best far-fetched in its aspirations, the thorough, courteous and
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clear manner in which Judge Gorven reached his various find-
ings and decisions is commensurate with the best traditions of
judicial impartiality and accountability, both to the parties and to
the wider public, in this country. This is encouraging, given some
of the dubious practices shown to exist in the administration of
justice and outlined in several respects in the rest of this section.
In Steyn NO v Ronald Bobroff & Partners 2013 (2) SA 311
(SCA), the ‘contentious question of the duties and obligations of
an attorney to his/her client’ and an attorney’s liability ‘for want of
the requisite care, skill and diligence expected’, were considered
by the appeal court. The facts (paras [5]–[8]) were briefly: the
appellant had instructed the respondent firm of attorneys to
pursue a claim under the Road Accident Fund on behalf of her
minor son, who had sustained serious head injuries in a motor
accident. A claim was lodged with the Fund, but was not met, with
the result that a trial date was set down, some four years after the
engagement of the respondent’s services. Four months before
the trial date, the appellant terminated the respondent’s services,
without giving reasons. Five days after the trial had led to an
award of damages to the appellant, she instituted a claim for
damages against the respondent, claiming interest of almost half
a million rand, calculated on the sum awarded as damages, over
the period of fourteen and a half months which, she alleged, had
been the delay caused by the respondent’s failure timeously to
lodge her claim. The gist of her claim was that the respondent firm
both advertised and was known widely as specialist personal
injury attorneys, and that she had therefore expected a degree of
professionalism and care in such matters which had not been
forthcoming.
Bosielo JA (with whom Brand and Shongwe JJA, and South-
wood and Saldulker AJJA concurred) deemed it wise to start his
judgment with a brief exposition of the evolution of the profession
of an attorney in this country, acknowledging that claims for
negligent conduct could lead to awards for damages by a court
of law (paras [2], [3]). He then set out in complete terms the
appellant’s particulars of claim detailing exact time periods which
had elapsed between the various stages in pursuing her claim
against the Fund, and decided that the matter was to be resolved
as one arising out of contract rather than delict (paras [11]–[14]).
The central question which needed to be resolved was whether
the fourteen and a half month delay in lodging the claim,
breached a tacit term of the agreement signed by the appellant
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when engaging the respondent’s services (para [24]). Given that
the head injuries that the appellant’s son had suffered were
complex, requiring more than one medical examination over time,
the court was unable to hold this delay unreasonable (para [26]),
especially given the respondent’s failure to adduce expert testi-
mony to the effect that such a delay was unreasonable (para
[29]). The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.
Brand JA delivered a brief separate judgment, concurred in by
the rest of the court, in which he clarified the nature of the
‘fundamentally flawed premise’ from which appellant’s claim
proceeded. This was that mora interest could only be claimed on
a principal debt, rather than, as here, as a ‘component in the
calculation of damages for alleged breach of mandate’ (paras
[35], [36]). On this ground too, Brand JA would have rejected the
appeal (para [38]).
While the disposal of this appeal appears to be reasonably
grounded, we feel constrained to note several instances of poor
proofreading encountered in the main judgment, such as the use
of ‘expedience’ when ‘expedition’ was intended in para [9], of
‘breadth’ rather than ‘breath’ in para [12] and the misspelling of
Aquilian (Acquilian — para [14]) and ‘practising’ (practicing —
para [29](f)). While one appreciates the great pressure under
which the judiciary mostly operates, such lapses are to be
regretted; fortunately, the fact that they have been noticed
indicates that they are not often encountered.
Delay in carrying out professional duties required the attention
of the Supreme Court of Appeal once again in Margalit v
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2013 (2) SA 466 (SCA), but in
this case the claim for damages in the form of interest on money
due to the client succeeded. The essence of the negligence
alleged by the client was the failure of the conveyancing attorney
to note that there were two bonds registered over the property
being sold, rather than just one, the resolution of which oversight
delayed transfer of the property and full payment to the seller,
who then sued for loss of interest on the principal sum. Leach JA
(with whom Nugent and Pillay JJA, and Southwood and Erasmus
AJJA concurred) had little difficulty in both establishing that
negligence existed and attributing it to the conveyancer’s over-
looking the existence of the second bond over the property, a
standard of care which ‘fell well short of what is expected of
a reasonable conveyancer’ who should ‘fastidiously examine all
relevant documents’ (para [29]). Interestingly, although expert
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evidence had been led in the court a quo, it had not touched
directly on the question to be decided by the court, but this did
not deter the Supreme Court of Appeal from ruling on the matter
of negligence because ‘the nature of the conduct may well be
such that a court, even without the benefit of professional opinion,
may determine that the conduct . . . clearly falls below the mark’
of reasonableness, as had been the case here. The court was
also constrained to comment critically on what seems to be an
astonishing level of professional error and incompetence by the
respondents, including the loss by Standard Bank of its copies
of both the title deeds as well as its mortgage bonds over the
properties: ‘[a]ccording to the evidence, banks losing documents
of this nature is an almost everyday occurrence’ (para [10]).
Two further judgments relating to professional practice in
general need to be noted at this point. In Law Society of the Cape
of Good Hope v Randell 2013 (3) SA 437 (SCA), the judgment of
the Eastern Cape High Court noted in last year’s Annual Survey
was unanimously overruled in a judgment by Mthiyane DP
(Majiedt JA and Van der Merwe, Swain and Mbha AJJA concur-
ring). The earlier decision had effectively stayed striking-off
proceedings brought by the appellant against an attorney who
was due to stand trial accused of criminal activity relating to his
non-professional duties as a member of a school governing body.
This approach was found to have erred both in legal principle
and on application to the facts of the case as ‘. . . a stay will only
be granted when there is an element of state compulsion
impacting on the accused person’s right to silence’ (para [23]), a
principle which accorded with approaches in foreign jurisdictions
(paras [24]–[26]). The appeal was dismissed with costs on an
attorney and client scale.
A rather alarming aspect of attorneys’ practice, if widespread,
was exposed and deprecated by the court in Plumb on Plumbers
v Lauderdale 2013 (1) SA 60 (KZD). Here Lopes J, in reading the
papers in sequestration proceedings, noticed allegations of fact
which sounded familiar. On further research by his registrar, three
further sequestration applications within the three-week-period
before the Durban High Court were discovered containing identi-
cal allegations of fact in the founding affidavits, a remarkable
coincidence (para [2]). The attorney concerned was asked
certain questions in this regard and filed affidavits to seek to
explain these coincidences, but the court was not satisfied that
the explanation justified what had happened in this case. In
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reaching this conclusion, Lopes J issued the following warning:
‘However much the swearing of an oath may have become
diluted in modern society by the inexperience or lack of training
of commissioners of oaths, or a lack of appreciation of their
functions, the swearing of an oath by a deponent is a serious and
important function’ (para [6]). After making further remarks which
highlighted similar concerns raised by judges about this matter in
the past, the court did not confirm the rule nisi, and referred
the conduct of the lawyers involved to the Law Society and the
Society of Advocates for further investigation (para [11]).
Contingency fees
Some years ago, in an attempt to widen access to the courts
and to regulate informal practices, the Contingency Fees Act 66
of 1997 was passed, requiring a number of formal steps to be
taken to safeguard the position of the client in such an arrange-
ment. This practice came before the courts in two reported cases
in 2013. In Tjatji v Road Accident Fund and Two Similar Cases
2013 (2) SA 632 (GSJ), Boruchowitz J had to rule on the validity of
three agreements to pursue claims against the Road Accident
Fund, all of which had been entered into between the respective
attorneys and clients within days of the trials which would dispose
of their claims. Were such agreements, which replaced earlier
agreements entered into between the attorneys and their clients,
valid in law? In several respects, the court found that, although
they may have been in the correct form, they failed to comply with
the requirements of the Act in substance. In particular, the judge
held that the Act was intended to be ‘exhaustive of the rights of
legal practitioners to conclude contingency fee agreements with
their clients’ (para [12]), that such an agreement which does not
comply with the Act is illegal (para [13]) and that, although the Act
was silent as to when exactly such agreements were to be
entered into (as was argued by the attorneys concerned, para
[14]), there were clear indications in the text of the Act that such
agreements had to be entered into sufficiently early so as to be
able to comply with the Act’s requirements (para [15]). Therefore,
in each case the new agreement was invalid (the reasons are set
out in paras [16]–[24]), and additionally so because they
attempted retrospectively to validate agreements entered into in
violation of the Act (para [25]). As these purported agreements
were invalid, the common law of a ‘reasonable fee’ for the work
performed was ordered by the court (paras [26]–[28]).
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The matter of contingency fees received much broader consid-
eration by a full bench of the North Gauteng High Court in South
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development (Road Accident Fund,
Intervening Party) 2013 (2) SA 583 (GNP). According to Kathree-
Setiloane J, who delivered judgment on behalf of the court
(Mlambo JP and Fabricius J concurring), the ‘meaning, effect and
constitutionality’ of the Contingency Fee Act had elicited much
comment within the legal profession, and the Law Societies of the
Northern Provinces and the Free State had, as a result, made
rulings permitting their members to conclude agreements ‘out-
side the prescripts of the Act, provided that certain criteria were
met’ (para [3]). The applicant in this case (‘SAAPIL’) was a
voluntary association representing personal injury lawyers which
sought a decision from the court as to whether the Act was
intended to exhaust the authority of legal practitioners to con-
clude contingency agreements with their clients. SAAPIL pre-
sented three arguments: that the Act did not override the
common-law right of practitioners to conclude contingency
agreements; that if the Act were found to be exhaustive, it would
be unconstitutional on the basis that it discriminated unfairly
against lawyers and their clients and so fell foul of section 9 of the
Constitution; and that sections 2 and 4 of the Act were unconsti-
tutional because they breached certain rights in the Bill of Rights.
These arguments were opposed by both the responsible Minister
and the Road Accident Fund.
The limitations of this forum prevents doing full justice to the full
and learned judgment of Judge Kathree-Setiloane, which bears
close reading, so the essence of her findings must be relied on
here. As to the first argument that the Act was not exhaustive, the
court pointed to any number of judgments under the common law
that contingency fee agreements were ‘contrary to public policy,
unenforceable and unlawful’ (para [7]). No matter, argued
SAAPIL, times had changed, and it was the duty of the court to
adapt the law to adjust to modern developments in legal practice,
and to serve to widen access to the courts for indigent clients.
The court declined this invitation, both because it considered that
the case law relied on by SAAPIL did not in fact support this view
(para [18]), but also because ‘law reform is primarily the respon-
sibility of the Legislature, and not the Judiciary’ (para [19]). After
further analysis of previous judgments on the issue of contin-
gency fees, including Tjatji (above), the court held that the Act
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was indeed exhaustive of the authority of the profession to
conclude contingency fee agreements: SAAPIL’s argument that
the Act did not preclude future developments permitting such
arrangements outside its four corners was ‘manifestly unfounded
and irreconcilable’ with existing precedent (para [34]).
As to the challenge based on inequality, Kathree-Setiloane J
carefully reviewed the then state of equality jurisprudence, in
particular the requirements that discrimination be rational, pro-
portional, reasonable and fair. She relied extensively on the work
of the South African Law Reform Commission which preceded the
adoption of the Act (paras [45]–[51]) and various ethical and
other practices of the attorneys’ profession to conclude that the
requirements put in place by the Act are both ‘laudable and
sensible’, and that SAAPIL’s proposition that it is unconstitutional
was unsustainable (para [52]).
Finally, SAAPIL’s argument that the setting of a cap on profes-
sional fees in section 2 of the Act contravened the right to have
access to the courts in section 34 of the Constitution, was
supported by no evidence in the papers (para [58]). The
approach is in line with those in comparative jurisdictions (paras
[59]–[61]), and even if this amounted to a limitation of the right, it
was permissible and justifiable in terms of section 36 of the
Constitution (para [62]). As to the Act’s apparent infringement of
the rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination (under
section 35 of the Constitution), such an argument was again
‘completely unsustainable’ and SAAPIL ‘has once again failed
dismally to put up evidence . . . to support these challenges’
(para [65]). This challenge was ‘patently lacking in merit and [fell]
to be dismissed’ (para [67]). The application was dismissed with
costs.
The clear and utterly persuasive approach taken by the full
bench in this matter leaves the reader with no doubt as to the
mind of the court and the conclusions it reached on the state of
this particular aspect of the law. It is also written with a strong
sense of the socio-economic conditions into which it will fall, and
sets the stage appropriately for the consideration of two cases
which reflect very negatively on the efficiency and probity of parts
of the attorneys’ profession. (As a matter of record, the Constitu-
tional Court in February 2014 held that there were no reasonable
grounds for success in an appeal from this judgment and another
one heard by the same bench: see Ronald Bobroff & Partners Inc
v De Law Guerre; South African Association of Personal Injury
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Lawyers v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
2014 (3) SA 134 (CC), a decision of the court.) The continued
attempts by certain law societies and practitioners to assert the
existence of a ‘common law’ contingency fee agreement outside
the parameters of the Contingency Fees Act is regrettable. This is
especially so in light of the clear statement by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc. v National Potato
Co-operative 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) para [41] that ‘any contin-
gency fee agreement . . . which is not covered by the Act is . . .
illegal’. Despite this, the use of so-called common-law contin-
gency fee agreements has been widespread. In light of the clear
authority, it is submitted that two things need to be done as a
matter of priority. First, attorneys who have utilised so-called
common-law contingency fee agreements, are under a legal,
moral and ethical duty to refund their clients all amounts over-
charged. Second, the Law Societies are under a regulatory
obligation to take appropriate steps against attorneys who have
abused the contingency fee regime.
Professional malpractice?
The first two judgments noted in this section make for at least
disturbing, and sometimes shocking reading, given what they
reveal about the state of the administration of justice in some
areas of legal practice. We start with an area which has been
prominent above and in which contingency-fee practice looms
large.
In late 2012, counsel for the parties in a claim under the Road
Accident Fund (‘RAF’) asked Judge Satchwell of the South
Gauteng High Court to make their agreement an order of court.
Perhaps they had no option but to request this from her, or
perhaps they were culpably ignorant of her role in the develop-
ment of this area of the law, but they certainly ended up with more
than they had bargained for. The sorry tale is told in Motswai v
Road Accident Fund 2013 (3) SA 8 (GSJ). In Motswai, an attorney
knowingly prepared court papers containing untruths in support
of a claim for general damages despite the fact that the road
accident victim had not sustained any serious injury.
The bare facts which underlay this judgment can be quickly
summarised: Motswai, a pedestrian, was injured in a motor
accident and suffered a soft tissue injury to his right ankle, for
which he was given painkillers after X-rays had been taken — no
permanent disability was expected by the medical doctor who
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treated him. Yet, within a year, a claim was registered on his
behalf with the RAF, including a claim for general damages, and
within a further nine months summons was issued against the
RAF for an amount more than triple the first claim, including
considerable damages for past and future medical expenses as
well as general damages for pain and suffering, loss of amenities
of life, and disability resulting from a ‘fractured right ankle’, and
costs. In the last category were recompense for the services of
several medical specialists as well as an occupational therapist
and an industrial psychologist, although the file before the judge
contained no reports from the last two, and the RAF had in its
defence procured a similar number of reports (paras [5]–[15]).
When counsel for the parties approached Judge Satchwell in
chambers, they said that there was only one outstanding issue to
be settled, and that was whether Motswai should be compen-
sated for loss of earnings attendant upon future need to undergo
physiotherapy for his injury. As the plaintiff was at that stage
employed on only three days per week, it took the judge a mere
‘30 seconds’ to determine that, should such treatment be still
needed, it could happen on those days of the week when he was
not working (para [16]).
Judge Satchwell starts her judgment by recording the fact that
she spent three and a half years of her life ‘considering the
principles and practice of road accident compensation both in
South Africa and throughout the world’, as chair of the Road
Accident Fund Commission. During this time she learned of the
important part which such compensation can play as part of a
national system of social security, but also that ‘. . . the current
system is both perceived by and utilised as a means of providing
a livelihood for administrators, attorneys, advocates and profes-
sional experts employed both by the RAF and road accident
victims’ (para [1]). In her words, the judgment before her was
litigation ‘for the sole benefit of an enrichment of those ‘‘facilita-
tors’’ of access to road accident compensation whom I have
heard one judge describe as ‘‘carnivorous’’ and whom I would
describe as ‘‘predatory’’ ‘(para [2]). With this opening salvo, the
court sets the scene for what follows: a litany of the cynical abuse
of a system set up to benefit some, yet ‘captured’ in certain cases
by others, those intended to make the system work effectively:
this, the judge informs us, is not an ‘unusual’ situation, her
sources being ‘many judges’ in her division of the High Court
(para [20]).
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There was, in her judgment, no triable issue: there had been no
serious injury as the basis for a claim, and an officer of the court
had prepared and signed pleadings knowing that they were
based on untrue allegations (paras [22]–[32]); there had been no
actual financial loss or quantum of damages, the road accident
victim would receive no benefit, and the apportionment for future
medical expenses had been an irrelevance (paras [38]–[52]).
These portions of the judgment are replete with comments critical
of the conduct of those who facilitated this charade, but Judge
Satchwell devoted certain sections of it directly to this aspect.
Under the heading ‘The Duty of Legal Representatives’ (paras
[33]–[37]), the judgment refers to those attributes stipulated in
earlier judgments of the courts to be required of legal practitio-
ners, such as ‘complete honesty, reliability and integrity’, while
also noting judgments in which the conduct of legal representa-
tives had fallen short of these standards. Satchwell J concludes
this section of her judgment by finding that the attorney repre-
senting Motswai had behaved in a manner which was ‘legally
untenable, iniquitous and ethically unconscionable’, and noted
that a copy of the judgment would be sent to the Law Society of
the Northern Provinces (paras [36], [37]). Furthermore, under the
general heading ‘Rewards for Facilitators’ (from para [53]), the
court isolates the benefits accrued by legal representatives
(paras [54]–[61]), medical and other experts (paras [62]–[77]),
and the ‘supine and uncritical’ attitude of the administrators and
attorneys employed by the RAF (paras [78]–[89]), and subjects
each such category of ‘facilitators’ to withering criticism.
Finally, when it came to the award of costs, Judge Satchwell
held that none of the legal representatives or other experts should
receive any fees: indeed, she was of the view that, if the latter
were to be remunerated, the attorneys should bear such costs de
bonis propriis. As this possibility had not been raised with them
earlier, she postponed a final decision on these costs to a hearing
to be arranged, but ruled definitively that counsel should be paid
on the magistrate’s rather than the High Court scale (paras
[90]–[92]). As part of her order, the judge required that her
judgment be forwarded to the Law Society of the Northern
Provinces, the Bar Council, the Chairperson of the RAF, the
Minister of Transport and the Health Professions Council.
Judicial criticism of the shocking practices detailed starkly in
this judgment were echoed, albeit within a more limited ambit but
in hardly less forthright terms, in Tasima (Pty) Ltd v Department of
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Transport 2013 (4) SA 134 (GNP), an appeal to the full bench of
the North Gauteng High Court from an order of Ledwaba J in the
urgent motion court in that division. While the substance of the
legal dispute between the parties concerned the respondent’s
alleged failure to abide by an agreement between it and the
appellant concerning the provision by the latter of an electronic
national traffic information system, a matter of national impor-
tance and much in the media, the truly shocking aspect of this
judgment is less the outcome than what it exposes regarding the
quality of service rendered to the respondent by the State
Attorney’s office.
Tuchten J (with whom Van der Merwe and Kollapen JJ con-
curred) devoted the entire first half of his judgment (paras
[1]–[43]) to recounting the tortuous procedural path that this
dispute had followed until that point, including applications to the
Deputy Judge President for special hearing dates, meetings
between the parties’ legal representatives which should have but
did not occur, requests by the appellant for contempt proceed-
ings, and so on. (There appears to be some inaccuracy in the
judgment itself in telling this story, as the references to ‘2012’ on
several occasions in paras [25]–[27] of the judgment make no
sense: ‘2013’ must have been intended.) Be that as it may, at the
root of these delays and frustrations of the administration of
justice was the State Attorney’s office in Pretoria, and particularly
one of its employees, Ms Lithole, who consistently failed to
respond to correspondence and meet deadlines. This was
evidence of a ‘startling dereliction of duty’ by the respondents,
which for example, included a ‘considered decision’ by counsel
in the case not to file answering affidavits to the appellant’s
factual allegations on occasion, an ‘exceptionally unwise’ deci-
sion, in the view of the court (para [14]).
Further evidence of dereliction of duty came in the founding
affidavit by Ms Lithole (referred to in para [31]) that the fact that
some communication had reached her from the appellant’s
attorneys on 21 December 2012, rendered her and other staff at
her office unable to respond, as they ‘had been preparing to go
on leave’ over the festive season. Ms Lithole’s answering affidavit
is described by the court as ‘disgraceful’: in describing her own
office as ‘dysfunctional’, she complained that the appellant’s
attorneys communicated mainly by e-mail, as she ‘rarely’ looked
at e-mails: had they instead written letters to her, she would
certainly have responded ‘accordingly’ (para [33]). This conduct
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appeared to the court to be ‘unprofessional’, and her whole
explanation appeared to be ‘questionable’, given the fact that she
had, on occasion in this litigation, resorted to using e-mail.
Indeed, the court felt compelled to raise the possibility (on which
it did not rule) that her explanation could in whole or part be
untruthful (para [35]). In any event, it ‘deprecated strongly’ her
conduct, which ‘seriously prejudices the administration of justice’
(para [36]). As a result, Tuchten J ordered that copies of the
judgment be sent to the Minister of Justice, the Portfolio Commit-
tee on Justice in Parliament and the Law Society for the Northern
Provinces, with a request that the latter investigate Ms Lithole’s
conduct and the office of the State Attorney (para [38]). The court
also had strong words of censure for the arguments of counsel for
the respondents as ‘utterly without merit’, for an attempt to
postpone the appeal, and also for the direct participation by
counsel in the formal administration of agreeing on trial dates
which should be left to the attorneys (paras [41], [42]).
As to the substance of the appeal, the appellant’s arguments
stood unopposed due to the failure by the respondents’ counsel
to file answering affidavits (para [46]). The rest of the judgment
deals with the consequences of the respondents’ failure to
comply with the agreements which it had made with the appel-
lant, and on who should bear primary responsibility for this, even
to the extent of being held in contempt of court order (paras
[47]–[72]).The court’s concern on this score was ‘exacerbated by
the alarming ineptitude’ with which the respondents had con-
ducted the case, including its ‘indefensible and incomprehen-
sible’ decision by counsel not to file answering affidavits (para
[59]). The appeal thus succeeded, and the court displayed its
displeasure with the respondents’ counsel by directing that
‘counsel for the respondents may recover no fees from their
attorneys or their clients in relation to this appeal and the
application for postponement, whether for consultations, prepa-
ration of documents or attendance at court’ (para [73], so
ordered, point 6.1, although provision was made for the counsel
concerned to contest this aspect within ten days of the order of
court). In addition, it was ordered that Ms Lithole bear ‘the costs
of the application for the postponement of the appeal including
the costs of both senior and junior counsel on the scale as
between attorney and own client. . . . The liability of Ms Lithole for
these costs will be de bonis propriis’ (point 4 of the order).
Given the extent and specificity of judicial displeasure and
censure expressed in this section of the Annual Survey, and the
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frequency with which judgments are being ordered to be referred
to those responsible for regulating the various parts of the
practising legal profession, it is appropriate to ask how the
various professional bodies have responded. In particular, aris-
ing from the cases outlined immediately above, what exactly
have the Association of Law Societies and the General Council of
the Bar done to counter professional abuse by some of its
members of the road accident compensation scheme? What
have the Chief State Attorney and the Minister of Justice done to
respond to the trenchant criticism of the state and conduct of the
Pretoria office? Should the courts not be moving to require, in
their orders, a specific obligation on those responsible to report
back to court, publically and in detail, about the steps that they
have taken to stamp out the decay which threatens those aspects
of legal practice identified in the judgments, much like the courts
from time to time impose structural interdicts on government
departments, usually in the socio-economic sphere, to report
back within a certain time to the court itself, detailing the action
taken? Certainly, the worrying signs noted in this respect over the
past few years of this publication, and the shocking tales
recounted especially in Motswai and Tasima above, give great
cause for concern. Perhaps it is for Parliament’s Portfolio Commit-
tee on Justice to begin to exercise some form of oversight in this
sphere. Certainly, as regards the practising profession, the cries
that we have heard over the years in the face of the Legal
Practice Bill about the efficacy of ‘self-regulation’ need some
justification in practice if they are to be taken seriously.
A matter of form?
This section on attorneys’ practice ends on a slightly less
disturbing, yet very serious point, and that is the tenacity of
unthinking sexist practices in legal practice, this time in the form
of statements attested to by commissioners of oaths. In ABSA
Bank Ltd v Botha NO 2013 (5) SA 563 (GNP), Kathree-Setiloane J
was once again called on to express stern and clear criticism, in
the face of a deponent to an affidavit stating that ‘she’ is female,
yet the commissioner of oaths before whom the deponent
appeared certified that the deponent was a male person. An
objection was lodged against summary judgment in circum-
stances where the commissioner, who worked for the plaintiff
bank, had committed such an error, where the deponent
described herself as the ‘manageress’ of the bank concerned.
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The plaintiff argued that this was a mere administrative error, but
the defendants took issue, and lodged an objection in terms of
rule 30 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Noting that courts are reluctant to give summary judgment
where they are not fully satisfied that plaintiff has an unanswer-
able case (para [5]), the judge rejected the argument by the
plaintiff here that resort to section 6 of the Interpretation Act 33 of
1957, justified the use of the masculine to include females. The
judge noted that an affidavit must be sworn to in the presence of
the commissioner of oaths: was the commissioner in this case
then mistaken as to the gender of the deponent? ‘What is the
court to believe?’ On the face of it, as a result, the plaintiff’s
verifying affidavit was ‘inherently contradictory and irregular’, and
therefore not an affidavit as contemplated in the rules (para [13]).
The application for summary judgment was refused, with costs,
and offers a salutary lesson for those who persist with pre-
constitutional practices, even if only for lack of effort.
Advocates
Given the relatively extensive exposure which misconduct in
the attorneys’ part of the practising profession has had in court,
as reflected above, it would be odd were indiscipline among
advocates not also to appear from time to time in the law reports,
even though its much smaller size and relatively tighter regulation
by the bar councils should conduce to the maintenance of
professional probity among advocates. Much damaging media
attention to the role of counsel in RAF matters in Pretoria drew to a
conclusion in General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Geach
and Others; Pillay and Others v Pretoria Society of Advocates and
Another; and Bezuidenhout v Pretoria Society of Advocates 2013
(2) SA 52 (SCA), the judgments in which tell a tale complementing
that in Motswai above.
The following situation gave rise to disciplinary action taken
against thirteen members of the Pretoria Bar (paras [8]–[50]). In
order to manage its cash flow constraints, the RAF adopted an
approach to claims against it arising from motor accidents which
allowed it to settle them only within a short period before they
were to be heard in court. This led to countless attorneys seeking
trial dates and briefing advocates to be ready to appear in court
on such dates, a practice mostly matched by the RAF itself, but in
the full expectation that almost none of the matters would have to
proceed to trial, as they either would have been settled in the
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days leading up to the trial date or on the day itself, or, if a trial
were indeed to result, a postponement would be sought. This
created an extremely difficult situation for the Deputy Judge
President responsible for compiling the roll, and led to certain
advocates who specialised in road accident matters accepting
several briefs for the same day in court, which fell foul of the
ethical prohibition in terms of the Bar rules on ‘double-briefing’.
Not only did it seem as though a blind eye was initially turned by
all concerned to this practice, but such advocates typically
compounded the felony by charging for each settled claim as if
they had devoted a day in court to each matter. This meant that
they were guilty of ‘overreaching’: they were often paid several
times over for the same day’s work, again contrary to rules of
practice and indeed the law. This sad state of affairs was
summarised by Nugent JA (with whom Mpati P and Ponnan JA
concurred) in the ‘main judgment’ as follows (para [27])
. . . the manner in which the affairs of the Fund were being conducted
made it ripe for plundering, and the advocates concerned set about
doing just that. To the extent that they double-briefed they trans-
gressed and that was at least potentially prejudicial to their clients. But
even where each instruction was capable of being fulfilled without
prejudice to the others they charged fees to which they were not
entitled. To have charged trial fees in those circumstances was
dishonest. It is unfortunate that the Pretoria Bar Council did not see
things that way.
The last sentence refers to the fact that most of the advocates
concerned and many others, including some of those later
involved in investigating these practices, did not see the latter
claims as dishonest (regarded as an astonishing attitude by
Nugent JA, para [40]). But the Bar Council was not idle: indeed,
when these practices first came to their attention in 2006, the
Council issued a circular to all its members, making it clear that
both double-briefing and overreaching characterised their con-
duct, and that persistence in such conduct would be visited with
disciplinary measures (para [29]). Regrettably, by September
2009 these practices had resumed, and the Bar Council con-
vened two different ad hoc committees to advise it as to what
disciplinary measures should be taken against thirteen of its
members.
In the event, substantial sanctions were imposed on each of
the thirteen advocates, consisting of both fines and suspension
from practice for between one and six months. The Bar Council
then applied to the North Gauteng High Court (a full bench of
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three retired justices, appointed as Acting Judges for this pur-
pose), for its endorsement of the measures taken, as well as any
other order it deemed appropriate. The end result was that seven
of the advocates were fined, their periods of suspension from
practice almost all increased, a further such period imposed but
suspended, and ordered to repay substantial sums of money to
the RAF. The remaining six were struck off the roll and ordered
to make repayments to the RAF (paras [48], [49]). The court
acted in terms of its authority under section 7(1)(d) of the
Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964, and it was this order
which was appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
In broad summary terms, the General Council of the Bar
(‘GCB’) sought through its appeal, the imposition of more severe
sanctions on the seven suspended advocates, while those struck
off the roll appealed against the severity of their punishment.
Essentially it was argued by all appellants that the High Court had
misdirected itself in several ways.
The appeal court was divided in its response, three of its
members dismissed the appeals in most respects, while the
minority would have upheld relatively minor aspects of the appeal
by the GCB. Nugent JA spoke for the majority on the general
principles to be applied in such an appeal, and on the merits of
the GCB’s appeal and that of Bezuidenhout. Ponnan JA wrote for
the majority on the appeals of the remaining five advocates who
had been struck off. As Nugent JA’s judgment was styled the
‘main judgment’ by the dissenting judges, it will be dealt with first.
Critical to the majority’s decision was the view which it took on the
limits of the role of an appeal court in the circumstances under
review. Relying on earlier judgments in similar cases, the court
outlined three stages of enquiry, the first two of which were
uncontroversial in this appeal (para [57]). What fell to be
assessed on appeal was the exercise by the High Court of its
discretion to determine an appropriate sanction, and the approach
adopted by the majority was summarised as follows (para [57])
[w]here a discretion is conferred it implies that the matter for decision
has no single answer and calls for judgment, upon which reasonable
people might disagree. That being so a court on appeal is restricted in
determining whether the decision-maker has correctly gone about the
enquiry. If he or she has correctly gone about the enquiry then a court
on appeal may not interfere with the decision, albeit that it considers
the decision to be wrong.
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In determining the GCB’s appeal, the main judgment refused to
be bound by the precise descriptive terms used by the High
Court in characterising certain factors as either ‘mitigating’ or
‘aggravating’ and so on: as the majority reasoned: ‘Going behind
the inapt language used in the judgment and examining instead
the line of reasoning it reveals — which I think one must do where
the judgment is no model of linguistic exactness or elegance, as
in this case — I find the judgment to reveal clearly that that is
indeed how the court dealt with the matter’ (para [73]). As to the
authority of any superior court to exercise discipline over practi-
tioners, the majority held this was inherent, with its ‘roots in
antiquity’ (para [78]). The majority held that the High Court had
not misdirected itself in ordering that the seven advocates be
suspended rather than struck off; and also dismissed the appeal
by Bezuidenhout against his striking off, save that it released him
from the obligation imposed to reimburse the RAF — the High
Court had not been entitled to order such payment where the
advocate was no longer within its jurisdiction due to his having
been struck off (paras [70]–[82]). The Supreme Court of Appeal
ordered that the errant advocates bear the costs of the appeal,
including those of the GCB (para [86]).
Ponnan JA started his judgment with the resounding but
frequently misunderstood line from Shakepeare’s Henry VI, to the
following effect: ‘The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers’. This
is often quoted mistakenly as an endorsement of a justified
anti-lawyer sentiment, yet the intention was the exact opposite,
for ‘The Bard recognised that for tyranny and anarchy to flourish,
the law and all those who were sworn to uphold it had to first be
eliminated’. However, to enjoy such status, ‘absolute personal
integrity and scrupulous honesty are demanded of each of them’
(para [87]). The five advocates who had been struck off sought
through their appeal to persuade the Supreme Court of Appeal
that they had been too harshly dealt with, and so this part of
the majority decision of the court analysed closely the order of the
High Court to determine whether there had been any misdirection
on its part, in the sense of the exercise of its discretion, the test as
described in the main judgment. In its view, the majority held that
a striking off was ‘wholly justified’ in each of the five instances,
and the appeals were dismissed (paras [88]ff).
But before dealing with the facts relating to the behaviour of
each of the five appellants in turn, and in some detail (paras
[97]–[118]), Ponnan JA dealt with the argument by one of them
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that one of the members of the High Court, Van Dijkhorst AJ, had
created a perception of bias against the advocates disciplined,
through a report of some remarks he had made to the pro forma
prosecutor in the disciplinary enquiry. Having established that the
test to be applied required twofold reasonableness, in that the
person perceiving it and the perception itself had to be reason-
able (para [91]), Ponnan JA examined the evidence, and found
no basis at all for the satisfaction of that test. As to the individual
merits of their conduct, it is appropriate to note the majority’s
summary conclusion: ‘Their transgressions paint a picture of
advocates who appear to be quite indifferent to the demands of
their profession. The sustained nature of their transgressions,
unlikely excuses and exculpatory explanations ‘‘manifest charac-
ter defects, a lack of integrity, a lack of judgment and a lack of in
sight’’ ’ (para [118], footnote omitted).
The dissenting judgment by Wallis JA (with whom Leach JA
concurred) was limited in its scope, but important in many
respects. The minority agreed with all but three outcomes of the
majority judgments, being a difference of view on the failure of the
appeal by the GCB against the suspension, and not striking off, of
advocates Geach, Guldenpfennig and Van Onselen (para [119]).
In broad terms, Wallis JA held that the High Court had misdi-
rected itself as to sanction in respect of both Geach and Van
Onselen, because it had reached incorrect factual findings; and
secondly, that it had further misdirected itself by insufficiently
observing the principle of parity in assessing sanction, which
necessitated a reconsideration by the appeal court of the sanc-
tions imposed on all thirteen advocates (para [120]).
After setting out the background (paras [121]–[124]) and his
interpretation of the law, in which he held that an appellate court
in the current circumstances was ‘in as good a position as a high
court to assess the facts’ (paras [125]–[129]), Justice Wallis
considered the principal misconduct of those disciplined, con-
cluding that ‘their misconduct was deliberate, flagrant, serious
and committed over a lengthy period of time’ (paras [130]–[140]).
He then moved (para [141]ff) to consider the ‘additional miscon-
duct’ found to have been established in respect of the disciplined
advocates, and it is here that the differences in opinion between
the majority and minority appear. In regard to Geach, the fact that
he had failed over a period of almost twenty years to register as a
vendor for Value Added Tax (VAT) purposes, which was an
offence attracting a possible prison term, that he had only so
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registered as the result of this enquiry into his briefing patterns
and financial affairs, and that he had responded to his potentially
criminal conduct with ‘breath-taking insouciance’ (para [148]),
persuaded the minority that the High Court had misdirected itself
in not sufficiently taking this into account in its judgment.
After a further consideration of what was required by way of
proving ‘fitness and propriety’ to practise as an advocate (paras
[151]–[155]), Wallis JA considered in each case whether the High
Court had misdirected itself as to sanction. He held that it had, in
respect of Geach, as his seniority and leadership position and his
flagrant failure to register for VAT purposes warranted his striking
off, rather than suspension (paras [158]–[164]). In regard to
Williams, Guldenpfennig and Van Onselen, all of whom were
suspended, the dissenting judges weighed up their misconduct
taken as whole in each case, against the misconduct of four of
those who had been struck off, in order to test the High Court’s
exercise of its discretion against the principle of parity, in
imposing sanction (para [167]ff). Wallis JA found that the High
Court had indeed misdirected itself in seven respects (para
[184]), and pointed out any number of disparities in treatment
between them (paras [188]–[194]), and so undertook a reconsid-
eration of the sanctions imposed on these seven advocates (para
[197]). As a result, the minority would have struck Van Onselen
from the roll, (para [203]), would as a ‘borderline’ decision have
allowed Williams to remain on the roll but suspended (para
[204]), but would also have struck Guldenpfennig from the roll,
because of the ‘nature and seriousness of the misconduct and
the terms of the response to it’ (para [206]).
Given the detail and length of these judgments, and the
seriousness of the subject matter, this summary cannot claim to
have done justice to their importance or close reasoning. It
suffices perhaps to remark on the astounding attitude taken by
most of those involved, and it seems further, that their misconduct
could somehow be seen as assisting the scheme of compensa-
tion of road traffic victims and was not dishonest, an approach
roundly and starkly condemned on several occasions in all three
judgments. In the context of the level of fraud and injustice
perpetrated by the attorneys (and others) in the cases described
earlier, we can only express the hope that the exposure of such
practices will lead to their immediate demise. One of the chief
means of ensuring professional accountability is a necessary
degree of open governance, and those bodies who regulate the
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practice of law are urged to continue to be vigilant and as open
as possible when instances of malpractice arise.
The National Prosecuting Authority
Democratic Alliance v President of The Republic of South
Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) is the final instalment in the litigation
concerning the appointment of Mr Menzi Simelane (‘Simelane’)
as the National Director of Public Prosecutions in the face of
concerns regarding his fitness for that office.
A brief account of the material facts is sufficient. Simelane, in
his capacity as Director General of the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development, was heavily involved in a dispute
concerning the proper role of then National Director, Mr Vusi
Pikoli (‘Pikoli’). Following Pikoli’s suspension, former President
Mbeki appointed a commission of enquiry headed by former
speaker of Parliament, Dr Frene Ginwala, to enquire into Pikoli’s
fitness to hold office. Simelane testified under oath before the
Ginwala Commission. The Ginwala Commission heavily criticised
the conduct of Simelane and commented adversely on the
credibility of his evidence. The then Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development requested the Public Service Com-
mission (‘PSC’) to investigate Simelane’s conduct during the
Ginwala Commission. The PSC recommended disciplinary pro-
ceedings against Simelane. The new Minister, Mr Jeff Radebe,
rejected the recommendations of the PSC (para [4]). The Presi-
dent then appointed Simelane as the NDPP two days after the
Minister had rejected the PSC recommendations.
The Democratic Alliance applied to the High Court for an order
reviewing and setting aside Simelane’s appointment, relying
primarily on the requirement that the NDPP be a ‘fit and proper
person’. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the President’s
decision to appoint Simelane was irrational and invalid for four
main reasons. The first was that, according to the President, he
had firm views about Simelane being the right person for appoint-
ment even before he had considered whether Simelane was fit
and proper. Second, the President incorrectly reasoned that the
absence of evidence contradicting the idea that Simelane was fit
and proper for appointment, justified the conclusion that he was
indeed a fit and proper person. Third, the President disregarded
the criticism of Simelane made by the Ginwala Commission on
the tenuous basis that the Ginwala Commission had not been
appointed to investigate Simelane, but Pikoli. Finally, the Presi-
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dent too lightly brushed aside the recommendations of the PSC
that disciplinary proceedings should be instituted against Sime-
lane (para [6]).
Although Zondo AJ dissented on one narrow issue, the court
was unanimous in dismissing the appeal against the decision of
the Supreme Court of Appeal. Yacoob ADCJ wrote the majority
judgment. He identified the following as the relevant issues
(a) The question whether the requirement that the National Director
must be a fit and proper person to be appointed to that position is
an objective jurisdictional fact antecedent to appointment.
(b) The requirements of rationality concerned in particular with —
(i) the distinction between reasonableness and rationality and
the relationship between means and ends;
(ii) whether the process as well as the ultimate decision must be
rational;
(iii) the consequences for rationality if relevant factors are ignored;
and
(iv) rationality and the separation of powers.
(c) An investigation into whether the decision of the President to
appoint Mr Simelane was rational and, in particular, whether the
President’s failure to take into account the finding in relation to
and evidence of Mr Simelane in the Ginwala Commission was
rationally related to the purpose for which the power to appoint a
National Director was conferred.
(d) If the decision is found to be rational in this sense then we must
evaluate whether —
(i) the evidence shows that Mr Simelane is a fit and proper
person to be appointed the National Director; and
(ii) the President had an ulterior purpose in making the appoint-
ment (para [12]).
Whether fitness and propriety is an objective requirement
After tracing the key provisions of the Constitution and the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, Yacoob ADCJ
turned to the question of whether the fit and proper requirement is
an objective requirement. The Supreme Court of Appeal had held
that the requirement that the National Director must be a fit and
proper person is a jurisdictional fact capable of objective assess-
ment (para [14]).
For slightly different reasons, Yacoob ADCJ agreed that the
requirement is an objective jurisdictional fact (para [20]). He
identified six reasons for this view. First, the Constitution leaves it
to an Act of Parliament to determine the content of the qualifica-
tion of the NDPP. Therefore, the Constitution does not leave the
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determination of appropriate qualification to the President, but
obliges the legislature to ensure that the NDPP is appropriately
qualified (para [21]). Second, the Act itself does not say that
the candidate for appointment should be fit and proper ‘in the
President’s view’ which it could have done had that been
the intention (para [22]). Third, while the fit and proper assess-
ment does require a ‘value judgment’, it does not follow that the
decision lies within the sole and subjective preserve of the
President. Value judgments, Yacoob ADCJ observed, are involved
in virtually every decision any member of the executive might make
where objective requirements are stipulated (para [23]). Fourth,
Yacoob ADCJ pointed to the constitutional provision requiring that
the National Prosecuting Authority perform its functions without
fear, favour or prejudice (s 179(4) of the Constitution). In the court’s
view, a construction that rendered the qualification criteria a matter
for the President’s subjective opinion would not be in keeping with
the constitutional guarantee of prosecutorial independence (para
[24]). Fifth, Yacoob ADCJ pointed to the provision permitting the
suspension of the NDPP on the basis that he is not a fit and proper
person. If the requirement were a subjective one, President A
might appoint a person in the subjective belief that the person is fit
and proper and President B might form the active view that the
person is not fit and proper and suspend him on that basis. Neither
the Constitution nor the Act could have contemplated that the
position of NDPP would be so vulnerable to presidential whim
(para [25]). Finally, Yacoob ADCJ relied on the importance of the
NDPP and the need that the office be non-political and non-
partisan (para [26]).
Reasonableness and rationality
Yacoob ADCJ then turned to consider the distinction between
reasonableness and rationality, insisting that the two must be
kept conceptually distinct (para [29]). Yacoob ADCJ described
the rationality review in the following terms
The reasoning in these cases shows that rationality review is really
concerned with the evaluation of a relationship between means and
ends: the relationship, connection or link (as it is variously referred to)
between the means employed to achieve a particular purpose on the
one hand and the purpose or end itself. The aim of the evaluation of
the relationship is not to determine whether some means will achieve
the purpose better than others but only whether the means employed
are rationally related to the purpose for which the power was con-
43THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ferred. Once there is a rational relationship, an executive decision of
the kind with which we are here concerned is constitutional (para
[32]).
By contrast, a decision will be unreasonable, if ‘it is one that a
reasonable decision-maker could not reach’ (para [29]).
Does rationality extend to the process followed?
Yacoob ADCJ confirmed that both the process by which a
decision is made and the decision itself must be rational (para
[34]). This conclusion raised the question whether each step in
the process must be rationally related to the purpose for which
the power is conferred (para [37]). Yacoob ADCJ held that the
decision of the President as head of the National Executive can
be successfully challenged ‘only if a step in the process bears no
rational relation to the purpose for which the power is conferred
and the absence of this connection colours the process as a
whole and hence the ultimate decision with irrationality’ (para
[37]). He held that the court must look at the process as a whole
and determine whether the steps in the process were rationally
related to the end sought to be achieved and, if not, whether
the absence of a connection between a particular step (part
of the means) is so unrelated to the end as to taint the whole
process with irrationality (para [37]).
Ignoring relevant factors
The court then turned to consider ignoring relevant factors as
an aspect of a rationality review. Yacoob ADCJ held that there is a
three-stage enquiry to be made when a court is faced with an
executive decision where certain factors have been ignored.
The first is whether the factors ignored are relevant; the second
requires us to consider whether the failure to consider the material
concerned (the means) is rationally related to the purpose for which
the power was conferred; and the third, which arises only if the answer
to the second stage of the enquiry is negative, is whether ignoring
relevant facts is of a kind that colours the entire process with
irrationality and thus renders the final decision irrational (para [39]).
Yacoob ADCJ was willing to accept that there may be rare
circumstances in which the facts ignored may be relevant, but
ignoring the facts would not render the entire decision irrational in
that the means might nevertheless bear a rational link to the end
sought to be achieved (para [40]).
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Rationality and separation of powers
The court made short shrift of the respondents’ argument that
reviewing and setting aside Simelane’s appointment would
undermine the separation of powers.
It is therefore difficult to conceive how the separation of powers can be
said to be undermined by the rationality enquiry. The only possible
connection might be that rationality has a different meaning and
content if separation of powers is involved than otherwise. In other
words, the question whether the means adopted are rationally related
to the ends in executive decision-making cases somehow involves a
lower threshold than in relation to precisely the same decision
involving the same process in the administrative context. This is
wrong. Rationality does not conceive of differing thresholds. It cannot
be suggested that a decision that would be irrational in an administra-
tive law setting might mutate into a rational decision if the decision
being evaluated was an executive one. The separation of powers has
nothing to do with whether a decision is rational. In these circum-
stances, the principle of separation of powers is not of particular
import in this case. Either the decision is rational or it is not (para [44]).
The appointment of Simelane
Having set out the relevant principles, the court turned to the
question of whether the President had acted rationally in appoint-
ing Simelane. The starting point for the court was to consider the
purpose for which the power was conferred on the President to
appoint the NDPP. For the court, this purpose is to ensure that the
person appointed as NDPP is sufficiently conscientious and has
the integrity required to be entrusted with the responsibilities of
the office (para [49]). The court examined the comments of the
Ginwala Commission on the evidence and conduct of Simelane,
and concluded that they ‘represented brightly flashing red lights
warning of impending danger to any person involved in the
process of Mr Simelane’s appointment to the position of [NDPP]’
(para [52]). The court concluded that any failure to take these
comments into account, or any decision to ignore them and
proceed with the appointment, would not be rationally related to
the purpose of the power: to appoint a person with sufficient
conscientiousness and credibility (para [52]). The court carefully
considered the specific facts relating to the proceedings before
the Ginwala Commission and concluded that all the Ginwala
Commission’s criticisms of the evidence and approach by Sime-
lane had a sufficient basis in the evidence before it (para [78]).
The court also held that the criticisms expressed in the report of
the PSC were well founded (para [78]).
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The court then turned to consider the reasons why the Minister
decided to ignore the criticisms by the Ginwala Commission, the
evidence before the Commission and the recommendations of
the PSC, and to advise the President to ignore these matters in
the process of making the appointment. The first reason given by
the Minister was that the PSC had not given Simelane an
opportunity to be heard. The majority rejected this reason,
observing that Simelane had been heard in the Ginwala Commis-
sion and that he would also receive a hearing in any disciplinary
enquiry that would be instituted (para [80]). It was on this issue
that Zondo AJ dissented, being unwilling to accept that the PSC
was not required to afford Simelane an opportunity to be heard in
the course of its investigation.
The second reason advanced by the Minister was that he
agreed with the submissions made to him by Simelane’s lawyers
consequent upon the recommendations of the PSC. Yacoob
ADCJ described the relevant submissions as ‘technical and
legalistic in nature’, and took the view that they ‘did not have a
bearing on Simelane’s integrity and honesty’ (para [81]). The
Minister’s third reason was that Simelane had not been able to
respond to the PSC because, absent an enquiry, the allegations
against him had not been proved. The court rejected this reason
too, holding that it was the Minister’s decision that resulted in
Simelane not being able to defend himself in an enquiry (para
[82]). Fourth, the Minister had argued that the Commission was
not investigating Simelane but Pikoli. Yacoob ADCJ held that this
reason was also unacceptable because it implied that dishonesty
on the part of a senior state official before a commission of
enquiry, where the enquiry is not directly about the person
concerned, can be disregarded (para [83]). The last reason
relied upon by the Minister was that the Ginwala Commission was
not a court. The court held that this was an irrelevant consider-
ation as ‘dishonesty is dishonesty wherever it occurs’ (para [84]).
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Minister’s reasons for
ignoring the indications of dishonesty did not hold water (para
[85]). Accordingly, the President’s decision to ignore these mat-
ters coloured the rationality of the entire process and rendered
the ultimate decision irrational (para [86]).
In two short paragraphs towards the end of the judgment, the
court qualified its judgment, stating that the judgment does not
mean that Simelane cannot validly be appointed as NDPP as he
may have an explanation and may be able to persuade the
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President that he is a fit and proper person (para [90]). Secondly,
the court noted that it was unnecessary for it to determine
whether Simelane is in fact a fit and proper person (para [91]).
These provisos are somewhat at odds with the overall tenor of the
judgment, which strongly suggests that there is no rational basis
to conclude that Simelane was — or could ever be — fit and
proper to be appointed as NDPP.
This judgment is of major significance for the administration of
justice for at least three reasons. First, it concerns the appoint-
ment of the most senior functionary in the criminal justice system
who is vested with the power to institute criminal proceedings on
behalf of the state, a function to be performed without fear, favour
or prejudice (s 179 of the Constitution). Given the levels of crime
in South Africa and the alarming degree of official corruption, the
NDPP occupies a critical constitutional position. Second, the
decision represents the important and appropriate degree of
oversight required by courts in a constitutional democracy. The
court was here confronted with a decision taken by the President
who has himself been the target of criminal prosecution. Yet the
court did not flinch from its duty to subject even decisions of
the President to critical scrutiny. The decision is thus a powerful
affirmation of the principle that no one is above the law. Third, the
decision has wider implications for the appointment of functionar-
ies generally, and particularly the importance of compliance with
statutory standards such as the ‘fit and proper’ requirement.
The institution of silk
The long-running saga of the constitutionality of the institution
of silk was finally resolved by the Constitutional Court towards the
end of 2013 (Mansingh v General Council of the Bar 2014 (2) SA
26 (CC)). It will be recalled that Mansingh, a member of the
Johannesburg Bar, had succeeded in the High Court in challeng-
ing the President’s powers to award silk (2012 Annual Survey 5).
The decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal
(General Council of the Bar v Mansingh 2013 (3) SA 294 (SCA))
and that court’s decision has now been confirmed by the
Constitutional Court. Nkabinde J, on behalf of a unanimous court,
characterised the issue as being the correct interpretation of
section 84(2)(k) of the Constitution and in particular, ‘whether the
President has the power under that section to confer silk or senior
counsel status on advocates’. She stated that the case was not
about ‘whether the institution of silk or SC status is good or bad,
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or whether it is worthy of protection’, nor was it about ‘the merits of
the applicant’s own unsuccessful application for SC status’ (para
[2]). Although Mansingh had raised a number of collateral issues
in her affidavits concerning, for example, the allegedly adverse
economic effects and personal distress caused by a failed
application for silk, the appeal turned on the narrow issue of the
meaning of ‘honour’ in section 84(2)(k) of the Constitution. That
section confers on the President the responsibility for ‘conferring
honours’. Adopting a purposive and contextual approach to
constitutional interpretation, Nkabinde J held that the concept of
‘honours’ is ‘linguistically wide enough to include the award of silk
status’ and that a proper reading of the section, taken together
with the historical context, ‘reaches the same conclusion’ (para
[20]). Nkabinde J further held that Mansingh had ‘not provided
sufficient basis for excluding the conferral of silk from the ambit
of the President’s power under section 84(2)(k)’, nor had she
pointed to ‘any features of the institution that warrant its exclusion
from the broad understanding of ‘‘honour’’ ’ (para [33]).
In the Constitutional Court, Mansingh took issue with the
Supreme Court of Appeal’s characterisation of the honour. She
had contended that the appointment of silk ‘purports to be a
certificate of professional quality by the President’ but, so it was
argued, the President was ‘not in a position to draw the merit-
based distinctions on which the system is founded’. Brand JA
rejected this argument. Instead, he accepted the argument
advanced by the General Council of the Bar that ‘what lies at the
heart of the conferral of silk is the recognition by the President, as
the head of state, of the esteem in which the recipients of silk are
held in their profession by reason of their integrity and of their
experience and excellence in advocacy’ (SCA judgment paras
[7], [9]). Mansingh persisted with her argument in the Constitu-
tional Court that ‘the status of silk was a form of certification of
professional quality’. Endorsing the approach of the Supreme
Court of Appeal, Nkabinde J dismissed this argument as being
‘without merit’ (CC judgment para [30]).
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, Mansingh advanced a new
contention, raised in neither her papers nor in argument in the
High Court. It was contended that the institution of silk itself
infringes the rights of non-silks to equality (guaranteed by s 9 of
the Constitution) and the right freely to choose one’s trade,
occupation or profession (guaranteed by s 22 of the Constitu-
tion). Brand JA rejected this argument. He reasoned that the
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contentions newly advanced were ‘devoid of any basis of fact’. It
was accordingly ‘not clear how the institution of silk in itself can
be said to impact on the rights guaranteed by section 9 or section
22. What is it in the institution of silk that offends the non-silk’s
right to equality or the way in which they conduct their advocates
practices?’. Moreover, if such an attack were open to Mansingh, it
ought to be directed ‘against the practices which are not inherent
in the honour of receiving silk — rather than against the institution
of silk itself’ (SCA judgment para [33]). This approach was
expressly endorsed by the Constitutional Court (CC judgment
para [37]).
The Mansingh litigation did not concern itself with the desirabil-
ity or otherwise of the institution of silk, or with the procedures for
its award. These are controversial questions. One of the more
powerful cases for the abolition of silk has been made by Owen
Rogers SC (as he then was) (‘Silk: Why it should go’ (2004) Dec
Advocate 26). This article was attached to Mansingh’s papers. A
considerable amount of Rogers’s argument rests upon the char-
acterisation of silk as being ‘a badge of forensic experience and
excellence’, which award by the President unfairly skews the
operational conditions of advocacy, an argument largely rejected
by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court in
the Mansingh litigation. These courts rejected the notion that the
conferral of silk is a certificate of professional quality. Leaving
aside proper legal classifications and accepting the characteri-
sation of the institution as recognition of the esteem in which the
recipients are held in their profession, there is still cogency in
certain of Rogers’s arguments. He contends that advocates
should depend on their reputation earned in the marketplace and
nothing else. By contrast, and by reason of the status attached to
silk, advocates are frequently selected not simply on the basis of
their ability, but because of their status. He argues that ‘from the
very fact that the institution of silk exists, many clients and not a
few attorneys, assume that the status is significant and even if the
wiser ones know that competence rather than status is what
should matter, they cannot be sure that the judge may not attach
significance to the fact that the other side is represented by a silk’
(26).
Rogers also argues that the institution of silk influences briefing
‘in a pernicious way’ because in cases where a wealthy client
briefs a silk, the other side might be induced to ‘match fire with
fire’ even though the case does not warrant it. Experience bears
out the correctness of this argument.
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Finally, Rogers takes issue with the procedures for the selec-
tion of silks. He considers criteria such as experience, durable
and extensive practice, and high standing as being ‘inherently
imprecise’ calling for a value judgment where views could
legitimately differ. Defending choices on a rational basis would
therefore be extremely difficult. He considers that reform of the
selection procedures could not remove the criteria which will
‘always remain imprecise’ (27). Once again, the force of this
argument is dependent on characterising the institution of silk as
a certificate of excellence. The argument is significantly diluted
— although not eliminated — when the institution is considered
as a reflection of the esteem in which the recipients are held by
their profession. Viewed in this way, procedures can be devised
to evaluate the esteem in which advocates are held by their
peers, although value judgments cannot be entirely excluded.
As the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out in the Mansingh
judgment, while each of the GCB’s constituent bars has desig-
nated its own procedure which ultimately leads to the granting of
silk, these procedures have certain elements in common: ‘In all
cases the process starts with an application for appointment by
the candidate for silk to his or her bar. The application is then
considered by a committee of silks of that bar. Thereafter the
names of the approved candidates are presented to the Judge
President of the particular High Court, who makes a recommen-
dation to the minister. The minister in turn makes a recommenda-
tion to the President, who confers the status of silk’ (SCA
judgment para [8]). The actual procedures for application and
evaluation at bar level have undergone radical revision, at least in
Johannesburg. Historically, an applicant for silk would apply to
the Bar Council. The silks on the Bar Council would deliberate in
private and, if unanimous, would forward the name of the
candidate to the Judge President. No criteria were laid down, and
there was an informal quota of silks each year to ensure that the
ratio of silks to juniors was kept within certain limits. The process
was thus lacking in transparency, the criteria were unspecified,
and the results frequently bewildering. Dissatisfaction was inevi-
table. Over the years the Johannesburg Bar Council has intro-
duced major reforms designed to make the process more
transparent and fair. The present procedure entails the following:
An applicant for silk is required to complete an extensive
application form setting out, inter alia, academic qualifications
and publications, if any; an overview of the candidate’s profes-
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sional history before admission to the bar; experience as an
advocate including the number of reported cases and appear-
ances in the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal
without a leader; an overview of the three most important or
complex cases in which the applicant has appeared within the
last two years; a list of all judges before whom the applicant has
appeared in cases of substance in the past two years; and a list
of silks who have led the applicant during the same period. The
applicant is also required to indicate any positions of leadership
held outside the bar and details of important outside achieve-
ments. The candidate is required to give an overview of service to
the bar and pro bono work, as well as transformation initiatives in
which the applicant has participated or initiated. Once the
applications are received, the names of candidates are made
known to the membership of the bar as a whole, and the
completed application forms are open for inspection. Any mem-
ber of the bar may comment in writing on any of the candidates,
and group leaders are required to elicit the views of junior
members. Group leaders must also convene a meeting of all silks
in the group to evaluate the candidates and convey the views of
the group, including junior members, to the bar council. All the
silks on the bar council must elicit responses from the candidates
to any adverse comments received. The silks committee of the
bar council must then interview group leaders to obtain feedback
on the candidates. Finally, each candidate is required to appear
before the silks committee to be questioned on his or her
application. The names of successful candidates are published
to the bar as a whole, and each unsuccessful applicant is entitled
to request reasons as to why his or her application was unsuc-
cessful.
The process now adopted in Johannesburg represents a
serious endeavour to make the system fair and transparent. Of
course, value judgments can never be eliminated. Ultimately,




In Fonde v Minister of Police [2013] JOL 30860 (ECP), the
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages arising from a police
raid conducted at his home. The police acted after receiving
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information which claimed that drugs had been bought at the
plaintiff’s house. The raid took place without a warrant but the
police contended that, had they delayed, they might not have
found dagga. In addition the magistrate’s court, where they could
have applied for a search warrant, was already closed.
The court found, on the probabilities, that the police had entered
the plaintiff’s house without his permission and had assaulted him
as he had alleged. Of significance is the following comment by
Robertson J (para [35])
The importance of the need for those in authority or positions of power
to comply with those obligations is particularly highlighted because of
the abuse of fundamental rights which took place in this country’s
past. Matomane and Sitinga were police officers prior to the enact-
ment of the interim Constitution, followed by the Constitution. One
would think that they would have comprehended the enormous shift
which took place in relation to the protection of fundamental rights. I
commented that they were unruffled during cross-examination. The
glib manner in which they stood their ground tells me that they do not
have a problem with the notion of torture. They are senior police
officers. What sort of message do they send to their juniors? What
effect does their conduct and that of police officers who commit
similar abuses, have on the morale of the police force? Given the
seriousness of their conduct and its wider implications, I believe it
necessary to direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the
Minister of Police and the National Commissioner of Police.
In F v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2013 (2) SACR
20 (CC), the Constitutional Court was confronted with the ques-
tion as to whether the Minister of Safety and Security should be
held vicariously liable for damages arising from the rape of a
thirteen year old girl by a policeman who was off duty at the time.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Safety and
Security v F 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA) had restricted the earlier
Constitutional Court finding in K v Minister of Safety and Security
2005 (6) SA 419 (CC), in particular finding that the conclusion in K
was based only on the delictual omission of the on-duty police-
men involved, and further that an intentional delictual commission
like rape did not attract vicarious liability for the state.
In overturning this decision, Mogoeng CJ found that the state
has a general duty to protect members of the public from violation
of their constitutional rights (para [53]). The Police Service ‘was
established and clothed with the power and authority to be the
hand through which the State would discharge these duties’
(para [60]). Further, ‘these constitutional duties resting upon the
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State, and more specifically the police are significant in that they
suggest a normative basis for holding the State liable for the
wrongful conduct of even a policeman on standby duty, provided
a sufficiently close connection can be determined between his
misdeed and his employment’ (para [61]).
On the facts the court found that the policeman was on standby
and that, although his police car was unmarked, he was driving
an official police car. Accordingly, his duty to protect the public
continued in these circumstances as he could be summoned at
any time to exercise his duties as a police officer in order to
protect the members of the public. A police vehicle had been
issued to him because he was on standby duty, and this vehicle
enabled him to commit the rape by giving Ms F a lift. When she
entered the vehicle she understood that he was a police officer.
The conclusion was made on the basis of dockets lying in the
vehicle and the police radio. The man was clearly identifiable as a
police officer. Accordingly, the court held that the Minister of
Safety and Security was liable for the damages suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the conduct of the police officer.
Crime statistics
The most recent statistics were published in the SAPS Crime
Report 2012–2013 for the period 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013.
The following table provides a comparison of contact crime, raw
figures and population dynamics between 2004/5 and 2012/13.
Comparison of contact crime, raw figures and population dynamics:
then (2004/5) and now (2012/13)













5 688 345 (12,2%)
Raw figure difference
Murder 18 793 16 259 − 2 534
Total Sexual offences 69 117 66 387 − 2 730
Attempted murder 24 516 16 363 − 8 153
Assault with the intent
to inflict grievous
bodily harm
249 369 185 893 −63 476
Common Assault 267 857 172 909 −94 948
Robbery with aggra-
vating circumstances
126 789 105 888 −20 901
Common robbery 90 825 53 540 −37 285
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The most reliable figure in this set of statistics is the number of
murders reported, given the fact that when a murder is reported a
body has been found. Accordingly, these figures are less likely to
be manipulated in order to reveal an improvement by way of a
reduction in crime. The murder rate has been reduced by 16,6%
over a period of four years, that is from 2008 to 2012, although in
the year now under review an increase of 0,6% was recorded.
PRISONS
Case law
Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 (2) BCLR 129
(CC) represents an important decision in the protection of the
health rights of prisoners. The plaintiff had claimed damages from
the defendant for harm which he had suffered as a result of his
having contracted pulmonary tuberculosis (‘TB’) while incarcer-
ated as an awaiting trial prisoner in Pollsmoor Prison for four and
a half years between 1999 and 2004. He sued the Minister of
Correctional Services for damages arising out of having con-
tracted TB.
While the High Court’s decision was in his favour, it was
overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal which found that,
absent proof that a reasonably adequate prison TB management
system would have eliminated the risk of infection, the require-
ment of causation had not been proved (2012 (3) SA 617 (SCA)).
On appeal to the Constitutional Court, the court reversed this
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal and held that the
Minister for Correctional Services was liable to the plaintiff in
delict. The case was then remitted to the Western Cape High
Court for a determination on the quantum of damages to be
awarded.
Nkabinde J on behalf of the majority of the court, found that our
existing law of causation justified asking the question whether the
factual condition of the plaintiff’s incarceration was a more
probable cause of his TB than would have been the case had he
not been incarcerated in these conditions. It was, therefore, held
to be sufficient to satisfy the test for factual causation that the
evidence established that the risk of TB contagion would have
been reduced had the prison authorities introduced proper
systemic measures. Accordingly, there was a chain of causation
between the negligent omission by the prison authority in failing
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to institute adequate systemic measures to curb the spread of
TB, and the plaintiff’s infection.
This judgment has been the subject of severe criticism. (See,
for example, LTC Harms ‘The puisne judge, the chaos theory
under the common law’ (2014) 131 SALJ 3, 7−9.) The majority of
the court may well have been better advised to have followed the
minority judgment of Cameron J who referred to ‘the rigidity of
the common law test for causation which requires claimants to
prove more probably than not that the defendant’s negligence
caused their injury’(para [94]). The established common law ‘but
for’ test may not have been sufficient to deliver adequately just
outcomes in certain cases. For this reason, Cameron J found that
the better approach would be to seek the development of the
common law ‘affecting a vulnerable group to whom our system of
constitutional protection owes particular solitude’ (para [113]).
Accordingly, he would have ordered the matter to be referred
back to the trial court for it to consider how the common law ought
to be developed.
In Masilela and Others v Bouwers and Others 2013 (2) SACR
350 (GNP), the applicants were long-term prisoners who had
been convicted of armed robbery and murder. They were classi-
fied by the Correctional Service authority as ‘high risk offenders’
who required maximum security incarceration because of the
violent nature of their crimes. They applied to court to be
transferred to a correctional centre in Johannesburg on the basis
that they wished to be closer to their families. Furthermore, they
contended that, were they to be housed at the Johannesburg
Correctional Centre, they would be able to further their studies as
courses that were offered at this centre were not presented at the
facilities in which they were presently housed.
Apart from the fact they had not adopted the correct procedure
in challenging the decision of the Correctional Service authorities,
these applicants had been classified as high-risk prisoners upon
admission. They were required to be held at a maximum security
centre until they had successfully completed a sufficient number
of rehabilitative programmes, which then might have justified
their reclassification and placement in a medium-security correc-
tional centre. There were sound reasons for the decision of the
Correctional Service authority to imprison the applicants in a
maximum-security centre. Accordingly, no basis could be found
by which the court should order that they be transferred to a
lesser- security prison which would be closer to their homes and
families.
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Prison statistics
The figures relating to the state of prisons in South Africa are
derived from the ‘Annual Report of Judicial Inspectorate for
Correctional Services’ for the period 1 April 2012 to 31 March
2013.
The prison population for the period 1 April 2012–31 March
2013 stands at 154 000 which has declined from the peak of
166 000 in 2008.
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During the 2012–2013 year, 709 deaths were reported in
prisons, 57 were unnatural and 652 were natural deaths. The
overall number of deaths reported declined from 852 reported in
2011/2012. Twenty inmates either committed suicide by hanging,
electrocuting themselves, setting their cells alight or from a drug
overdose.
The inmate population on 31 March 2013 stood at 153 049
comprising 104 670 sentenced prisoners and 48 379 remanded
detainees. Although the figure for sentenced offenders declined
from the previous year — when it stood at 111 814 — the figure for
remand detainees increased from 46 351 to 48 379.
The comments of the Judicial Inspector in this regard are
instructive.
At a cost of approximately R9,000 per month per inmate, the problem
is grave and has a serious impact on other budget allocations, to the
detriment of providing for socio-economic needs. Lengthy periods in
detention, it is accepted, are not always the fault of the state but also
that of an accused and/or his legal representative. Well-managed
courts shorten the time period from first appearance to finalisation; the
net result would be advantageous to the administration of justice.
However, courts are dependent on the police, prosecutions and
defence. Our criminal procedure permits plea and sentence agree-
ments (‘plea-bargaining’), which are dependent on the prosecutor,
and by extension the police, to provide the accused with details of the
case against him/her to make an informed decision to tender a plea of
guilty.
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